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THE NEW PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE—A CRITICISM.¹

(Continued.)

I. THE VALUE OF SCIENCE (Continued).

Before answering this question: is the scientific fact an interpretation of the common fact suggested or required by our needs or its practical use in our life? are scientific facts means of action rather than objects of knowledge? let us first have a clear and definite notion of the various terms; this is a point of great importance as, to our mind, the apparent and superficial solidity of Pragmatism has its ground in the confused and promiscuous meanings in which these terms are taken.

"Practical" may mean the attainment of an end, and in this sense evidently every scientific observation as well as any action, intellectual, voluntary or motor, is practical; it is performed for an end, intellectual action in order to know, motor action in order to move; but then practical simply coincides with finality. In the same way "action" may mean the realization of any activity; this is its primitive sense. Thus understood, action is evidently a leading and primary notion; in this sense, knowledge is action, an action of the intellectual order as willing or moving are actions of our powers of will and

¹ Cf. *The Catholic University Bulletin*, April, 1906; March, 1908; June, 1909.

execution, and the question to be decided is which, of these different actions, is to have the primacy. But here, for those who object to the intellectualism of science, these words are supposed to have a special meaning.

"Practical" and "action" are opposed by them not to concrete and efficacious knowledge, but to pure knowledge, especially to abstract and discursive knowledge. "Practical" then means essentially what is useful and fruitful, that which has a value of utility and fruitfulness for us in the conduct of our life or in our domination over nature; "Action" means that operation by which we take experimental and effective possession and direction of things, of the forces of nature, and so make them realize themselves into results. So understood, they say, action does not exclude, it rather includes thought, concrete and living thought in union with all the other elements of living action; but it is in opposition to pure knowledge, especially to abstract knowledge, which essentially means the representation of things, speculation and contemplation. It is in this sense that action and practice are said to have the primacy over knowledge and speculation, that science is said to have primarily a practical value; that it is first of all a means of action. Then its value is to be measured by its consequences in practice not by its truth as representation unless² truth is said to coincide with practical consequences; by the power it gives over nature not by the knowledge it gives of it, unless this knowledge itself is said to consist and to be measured by this very power.

We maintain as against such a proposition that science has primarily a value as knowledge, as speculation, as representation and as truth and only by way of consequence a practical value or value through application; that this practical value, though it may verify our knowledge, does not, however, con-

² Were we to extend our criticism to all kinds of pragmatism, to that of W. James in particular, we would have to determine more carefully these divers terms; for James, "practical" means that which is being verified through particular and concrete consequences; "Action," that operation by which we arrive at practical, *i. e.*, particular and satisfactory consequences. Yet we think that most of our remarks may be applied in their general and fundamental sense to any conception of Pragmatism. But we are dealing here especially with the New Philosophy.

stitute or even measure it, but rather is obtained and measured itself by the degree of knowledge previously acquired; finally that scientific facts are, above all, objects of knowledge.

Let us take a case apparently more favorable to the pragmatist, that of a physicist who studies, for instance, in view of the practical results he may obtain. He observes certain facts; what is the meaning of this observation and the real influence of his practical considerations on its value? It is evident that the hope of a practical use resulting from his observations will be a stimulus to his reflexion; again, according to the practical results which he expects from his observations, he will apply his attention more particularly to such or such property of these facts; he will then consider among these facts rather those that manifest more clearly this property; he will then use such or such an instrument better adapted to the observation of this special aspect; he will be satisfied with such or such a degree of precision; what does all this mean? It means simply that the use hoped for excites and stimulates the exercise of his mental and reflexive operation, may determine its direction, its degree of precision, yet without in any degree constituting it; *it influences its exercise, it does not in any way determine its nature.*³ Again, the success of the practical application will be a sign and a confirmation of the truth of the observation, it does not constitute it; verification is a consequence of truth, not truth of verification. Its nature as an act of observation is determined by the objective fact observed and constituted by its adaptation to this fact; it is and remains essentially and primarily an act of knowledge. It is precisely this knowledge of the fact that will condition its possible use, the extent, means and significance of its practical application; prevision and power are the results of knowledge, results directly determined and measured by the very precision and degree of knowledge acquired.⁴

³ Cf. S. Thom., *Summa Theol.*, 1^a 2^{ae}, IX, 1, c; XIII, 1, c; XVII, 1, c., etc.

⁴ It is also the fundamental idea exposed by Prof. Schiller in his books *Humanism* and *Studies in Humanism*, that our knowledge is determined at every step by our interests and preferences, wishes and purposes; that our interests impose the conditions under which reality can be revealed to us. (Cf. *Humanism*, pp. 7-11). That "truth is what is useful in building up a science, a falsehood what is useless or noxious for the same purpose . . . to determine therefore whether any answer to any

But besides the scientist who is looking immediately for useful application, there is also the scientist who studies above all in order to learn and to know, without any direct thought of or wish for practical results; the history of science teaches us very plainly that it is mostly by the work of those scientists who seek for knowledge that science has progressed and that it is at times at least when this ideal has been abandoned for utilitarian applications that it has begun to decline. Such is the testimony of historians of science like Tannery and Duhem, and of experimental scientists like Cuvier, Claude Bernard or Pasteur.⁵ Knowledge for its own sake is so imme-

question is 'true' or 'false' we have merely to note its effects upon the inquiry in which we are interested and in relation to which it has arisen. And if these effects are favorable the answer is 'true' and 'good' for our purpose and useful as a means to the end we pursue." (*Studies in Humanism*, Essay v, pp. 144-154). Almost the same theory is exposed by Professor Dewey, who opposes the "functionalist" to the "representative" theory of knowledge. In an article on "the Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism." (*Mind*, April, 1905), Prof. Schiller had challenged Professor Taylor to give examples of a proposition whose truth or falsehood would not depend upon its practical application. Professor Taylor ("Truth and Consequences," *Mind*, January, 1906), cited three instances among them the proposition that the hundredth decimal of the formula π is or is not 9. Professor Schiller ("Pragmatism and Pseudo-Pragmatism," *Mind*, July, 1906), answers that the question whether or not this decimal is 9, is not solved until the decimal is calculated and that it will not be calculated until there will be found some usefulness in doing so; hence some intention and purpose will be found at the foundation of such an operation. Here we have a clear example of the ambiguity of the terms "practical," "usefulness," "finality," "end," etc., as used by the Pragmatists. It is true that every research supposes some interest as its motive. But besides the fact that this interest may be of an intellectual order, the question is to know whether or not this interest has any influence on this research as to the nature of its result. Now, it is evident that this decimal, before any operation of thought is not known yet it is predetermined in its nature and objective existence; and our intellectual operation will simply find, not create or invent it. Professor James says plainly: "The hundredth decimal of π is predetermined ideally now, though no one may have computed it." (*Pragmatism*, p. 211.) Then will not the truth of the computation consist in and be measured by the degree of adequation between our mental concept and this predetermined ideal, independently of our interests or of practical consequences,—their satisfaction or realization being the result, or a means of verification, not a constitutive element of this truth?

⁵ Cf. F. Mentré: Note sur la valeur pragmatique du Pragmatisme, *Revue de Philosophie*, 1 Juillet, 1907.

diately the first end of science that many problems or scientific researches have no practical results, at least no practical results known or anticipated; and yet no one would dare say they are not a part of science; to do so would be to remove from it, many scientific questions and possibly the most fundamental problems. Many scientific discoveries have been made without any prevision of their results, sometimes through a happy coincidence; their value in the way of application has been realized only a long time afterwards, being suggested by the consideration of the new knowledge acquired since. This practical value has been more frequently realized not by the scientist himself, who would have been unable to think of them, but by some minds, artistic and industrial rather than scientific, who, on the other hand, would have been unable to discover the scientific facts.⁶ Briefly the data of experience are studied primarily to be known; scientific facts are above all a representation as exact as possible of reality; often they are merely representations and yet as such they are a real and complete element of science; when they become means of action they become such only by and through the knowledge we have of them and according to the degree of precision which this knowledge attains.

If we study now the scientific laws, we shall reach a similar conclusion, with this difference, that while scientific facts represent simple facts, scientific laws represent the relation between these facts. We are told that laws are conventional definitions, practical recipes or directions, that they are efficacious rather than true, that they furnish us with the means of acting upon reality rather than with the knowledge of it. If we examine these propositions more carefully we shall find in them the

* One should not be deceived by confusion and ambiguity. We may be told that even the most apparently disinterested among scientists is himself prompted by utilitarian motives, by some interest or purpose; he observes at least in order to know better and this is something useful. The scientist indeed observes in order to know more clearly and more distinctly, but evidently if there is any question of utility in this case, practical use coincides with finality. An intellectualist can therefore accept this proposition, but there is no more room for an opposition between action and knowledge,—there is no more room for Pragmatism.

same confusion already pointed out in our study of scientific facts; we shall find that in order to express the truth, the terms in these propositions should be inverted: laws are efficacious because they are true; they are means of action because and in the measure in which they are representations of reality.

According to Professor Le Roy, when I say that "phosphorus melts at 44° ," or that "in the case of the free fall of heavy bodies, the space passed through is proportional to the square of the time," I do not formulate laws but I enunciate, in the first case, the definition of phosphorus,—any body with the same properties but with another melting point will simply receive another name;—in the second, that of free fall,—whenever a body does not fulfill this condition we say that there is no free fall;—and so on with other laws. These definitions, he explains, are conventional and contingent; they are not imposed by experience but rather suggested by it; it is our mind that formulates them not by an arbitrary decree but by a choice freely made between divers possible determinations; the determination selected is directed by our desire not of a clearer knowledge but of practical applications.

Here again Professor Poincaré vigorously opposes Professor Le Roy's views. In reality, Professor Poincaré says, these propositions are formulated by the scientist as laws, in the proper sense of the word. He truly intends to express a necessary relation between a body endowed with certain properties, a given color, a given density, a given specific heat, etc., which constitute phosphorus, and such a degree of fusion; if, perchance, some day a body would be found with the same properties as phosphorus and a different melting point, then, the scientist would simply declare that the law formulated was false and he would begin his experiments over again.⁷ He will hesitate indeed before declaring false the law as first enunciated, and Prof. Le Roy is right when he says that the scientist will preserve it as long as he can, that he will seek by all possible means to preserve it, while acknowledging the new discoveries; but the reason is not because he has formulated this law as a

⁷ Cf. Poincaré, *La Valeur de la Science*, p. 235 sqq.

convention; it is, on the contrary, because this law has been imposed upon him by experience, because he is convinced that he has expressed in this law experience itself.

Again, whatever may be his relative freedom in the method of his investigations or the selection of his instruments, the scientist has so little freedom relatively to the law itself that he will stop only when he will have found clearly a necessary relation between the divers terms of the law as formulated. This is what explains the agreement of all scientists upon the acceptance of this law. This relation is not *made* but *found* always more or less precisely by the scientist; he does not impose it upon the facts but the facts themselves first suggest and finally impose it upon his mind. He will always meet in his investigations of the facts and of their relations an element of necessity, an "*invariant universel*" which imposes itself upon his mind, guides it in its elaboration and progressive steps, whatever may be the various methods he has used, and enforces the result with whatever relative precision the formula may express it. Scientific laws appear therefore as expressions of the real and objective relations existing between the facts, expressions that are more or less approximate and hence subject to progress, but that are always measured in their exactitude by their correspondence with the objective reality and not as conventions devised by our mind. Sometimes, it is true, it may be useful, for the sake of method, to adopt a law as the definition of the phenomena which it is supposed to regulate; but this is not the normal method in science; the circumstances in which it may be applied are limited and if it were adopted as the ordinary process, science would lose all its meaning and teach us nothing.⁸

Again, we are told that our scientific laws are efficacious rather than true; we maintain that they are efficacious because they are true and in the very degree in which they are known to be true. We do not deny indeed, that laws are means of action; they furnish us with the power of prevision and control, and this result, although not its end, is one of the stimulating

⁸ Cf. Poincaré, *op. cit.*, pp. 238, sqq.

elements of scientific life. But whence arises this correspondence between our prevision of the facts that are to happen and their realization in the present except from this, that the law expresses objective relations of experience? Whence comes the efficacy of our action—when, handling the scientific law, we dominate nature and force it to reproduce at our will certain effects,—except from this that the law enables us to foresee events and produce them because it sees and contains them? The exactitude of our prevision and the success of our action simply manifest the truth of our knowledge. A law is efficacious because it is true and its efficacy manifests its truth.

We may be asked how it is that a law in its oneness and simplicity can represent with even an approximate certitude facts and relations so numerous, so widely different; for after all, there are not two facts entirely alike in nature; there are always many concrete differences between the present or the future event and that which is past; one never reproduces the other exactly. This is true, but we may as well ask how it is that one simple law can enable us to foresee and reproduce so many different events; why could it not represent that which it can foresee and reproduce? We must remark that, in this almost infinite variety of facts, there is always some common character of fundamental similarity of relations. Facts concerning heat differ from one another in degree, time, place, etc., yet they are all facts about heat; each one has its own intensity measured by a common standard. This common fundamental character, relation or standard is precisely what is represented in the law and because it is not limited to any one fact in particular, it is able to represent all of them, past and future, and to foresee and reproduce them. True, it is abstract, but let us not forget that abstraction does not mean vagueness but rather depth and condensation; compared to our immediate perception of the individual fact it lacks its wealth of details, but it surpasses it by its penetration of the central elements that constitute it; it tends to represent the very real and fundamental character or relation that makes the facts the kind of facts they are or the relations the kind of relations they are independently of, and even as realized with, their

individual particularities. Facts and relations indeed exist in nature only individually; but this individuality far from doing away with this fundamental character or relation is both the condition and the consequence of its very realization. This law is not a representation in so far as it enables us to foresee and reproduce facts or relations of facts; it is not determined and measured by these practical applications; but rather we foresee and reproduce them in the measure in which we know them in an antecedent representation; our prevision of, and domination over, them are suggested, directed and determined by that knowledge; prevision and power do not constitute but verify knowledge, not indeed in Prof. James' sense that it makes it true, but in the sense that it manifests its truth more and more fully.

We should here discuss Professor Bergson's principles and especially his fundamental assertion on this subject of the value of science, viz., that science is essentially determined in its concepts and laws by the advantage of measurement for practical use; that under this influence, it substitutes for concepts of real quality with its intensity and of duration with its continuity those of quantity and time built by our mind with the elements of number and space, replacing, by this process, the true reality by utilitarian symbols. Such a discussion would demand a special study by itself; we shall have moreover the occasion later on to touch upon this problem in considering the relations between concept and intuition. We shall simply recall here an instance, the most typical perhaps given by Professor Bergson and show how scientific law represents true reality where he sees only a utilitarian construction of our mind; it is taken from Mechanics. The fundamental laws of mechanics, he says, do not attempt primarily to represent their object, viz., motion in its objective reality; their primary end is to furnish us with a concept which enables us to handle reality advantageously; and so we build up the concept of motion with simultaneity and time; motion, in this manner, is measurable and easily used; but it is no longer real motion; this is so true that "were all the movements of the universe to

take place two or three times faster than they actually do, we would have to change nothing in our mechanical formulas.”⁹ The example, as we said, is striking and seems to be decisive. The remark is true but it does not express the whole truth. It is true that, if the velocity of all the movements in the universe was two or three times greater, we would have to change nothing in our mechanical formulas; but it is precisely on the strict condition that all the movements would increase together and that this increase would be exactly two, three, etc., . . . times greater than the actual velocity. This simple remark is sufficient to show that there is a correspondence between the formula and reality. Our formulas do not represent motion in its individual and concrete existence,—this is the partial truth of Professor Bergson’s statement;—but they represent it in an abstract and condensed, yet exact and objectively true concept; it is just why they are scientific.

We come now to the examination of the physical theories. Here, at first glance, the New Philosophy seems to have a good ground for its criticism of the sciences. In the building up of these theories, mathematics plays an important part and mathematics can be only a symbolical representation of physical facts; hypothesis has a large place and hypothesis is an invention of our mind. We see the scientist accepting successively, or side by side, diverse or even contradictory theories, as is the case with the English school where one theory is substituted for another, and gives the mind the same satisfaction; how then, can we hold that a physical theory is primarily knowledge, a representation of reality?

These conclusions, however, are superficial; and a little reflexion about the scientist’s method of research will show that the representative element is always the central and directing force of this investigation and its end,—that, as representations, theories have a truly objective value.

It is true that it is under the influence of Mathematics that a physical theory is constructed; it is through the application of Mathematics to physical facts and laws that Physics presents

⁹ Cf. *Cath. Univ. Bulletin*, April, 1906, p. 153.

a systematic and precise connection of facts, principles and deductions; and in order to obtain such a result, it is necessary that physical qualities be expressed in terms of quantity. Since there is, in this case, diversity of nature between the two elements, between the sign and the thing signified, Professor Duhem says of the physical theories that they are "symbolical;" we should prefer, and we believe this to be the sense intended by Professor Duhem, the term "analogical." But we think that the relation between the mathematical sign and the intensity of a quality is something more than that. It is based on a necessary and objective connection which strictly determines the sign to represent exclusively and if not adequately, at least exactly, the quality with its various degrees of intensity. Whatever may be the origin of a system of numeration, so long as it remains a mere system of numbers, it does not take on any special objective signification;¹⁰ but as soon as it is applied to an object or a class of objects, it receives a well determined meaning from them and is regulated in its applications and combinations by the objective relations existing between these objects; it tends to represent them with precision. Here, it is true, we do not apply the mathematical signs directly to the quality as, for instance, to heat, but to some quantitative phenomenon such as temperature; but it is because the two phenomena are given together in the objective data and vary in exactly the same proportion. The application, therefore, of Mathematics to Physics is not so much a process of substitution as one of expression; the mathematical sign is to the object signified as the word to the idea it expresses; it takes its objective meaning and value from the object as the word from the idea; it expresses, as precisely as possible, the divers intensities of the qualities and is more or less approximative, in the objective sense, according to the precision of its correspondence with reality; it remains therefore that physical laws and theories, even expressed

¹⁰ We do not mean here that the system is not, when constituted, subject to laws or relations necessary in themselves. We mean that it is of itself indetermined as to its application to different kinds of real objects.

mathematically, are true or false, although they may be more or less adequate.

How then are we to explain the succession of physical theories in presence of the same facts, their mutual opposition or even contradiction, as is the case of the mechanical models of the English schools? Does not all this show that physical theories are simply a method of illustration or practical instruments to handle phenomena without consideration of their representative value of reality? Here, we have to distinguish carefully between the hypothetical and the stable elements, between the stage of formation and the stage of acquisition. Now it is evident that in the stage of formation, hypothetical elements play a great part; in the building of hypotheses, on account of the prevailing state of incertitude, imagination has to exercise its inventive power and the mind has a certain freedom in directing it. Even in this preparatory step, however, freedom is not left to its caprice; it is, first of all, strictly bound by the law of contradiction, and in urging the imagination to find devices, it is always guided by the facts and laws to be represented. But, as this stage is one of research, a stage of trials and attempts, there is no wonder then that the various, opposite and even contradictory hypotheses are used; the scientist knows their character well; he subjects them to a successive examination, but he does not accept any of them as integral and definitive; this he does only when, after careful observation and experimentation in view of the different hypotheses, he finds the one which respects and represents more exactly the objective reality and which is therefore the most satisfactory. This hypothesis will form the physical theory. It may be that this theory itself is not wholly satisfactory, that it does not represent exactly certain laws or facts, it will then be subject to correction, to progressive determinations, which will make it more and more exactly representative of the facts. The most simple theories are ordinarily accepted rather than the more complicated; this is not because the complicated theories are difficult to handle but because simple theories are clearer. The history of theories shows that there is in their elaboration a continuity of formation when some elements disappear and

others remain; those that disappear are hypothetical elements or premature conclusions not suggested or guaranteed by experience; that which remains is the essential.¹¹ In the various theories of light, from Newton's theory of emission to the electrical theory of Lorentz and Thomson, passing through the undulatory and electro-magnetic theories of Fresnel and Maxwell, the physicist can recognize the essential element common to all. Professor Duhem, one of the best historians of mechanical and physical sciences, affirms that hypotheses together with the theories they suggest are the result not of a sudden creation but of a slow and progressive evolution in which every age, since the early period of reflexion, has its part; he illustrates his statement by a brief survey of the development of the theory of universal gravitation,—taking its rise with Greek science wherein it is contained in germ, passing through the explanations of the Schoolmen, the theories of Kepler and the experiments of Newton. "At no time in the history of universal gravitation," he says, "does the historian of Physics meet with a phenomenon that looks like a sudden creation; no moment when the human mind free from any impulse foreign to the solicitation of present experiments, has used in the formation of its hypothesis all the freedom Logic allows it."¹² What is the meaning of this constancy of the essential elements in spite of the variety of hypotheses made or of the processes used by our mind? what is the meaning of this continuity of progress through the divers and successive ages but the manifestation of the influence of an element independent of any human mind, which commands and controls our thought and finally expresses itself in theories? It is also what explains the fact that scientific theories and discoveries appear simultaneously in different minds without mutual communication.¹³

It is true that the farther we go into science, the more difficult it is to obtain an exact knowledge of reality. It is more difficult to formulate laws than to observe facts; and it is still

¹¹ Cf. H. Poincaré: *La Valeur de la Science*, pp. 268-269.

¹² *La théorie physique*, pp. 356-367.

¹³ *La théorie physique*, 2d p. ch. VII.

more difficult to discover theories than to formulate laws. Professor Duhem says that facts and laws have evidently an objective value; as to theories, he does not admit that they have the same objective value, their purpose being simply to represent the greater number of experimental laws with the greatest possible precision. But in what sense does he understand this? He admits that the great fact which sums up the whole history of physical doctrine consists in this, that diversity is fused into a unity always more comprehensive, always more perfect. As a physicist "he finds in himself an irresistible aspiration toward a physical theory that would represent all experimental laws by means of a system with a perfect logical unity"; while remaining in the domain of pure Physics he could not discover the entire *raison de être* of such a development; but if yielding to the nature of the human mind, he enunciates the metaphysical proposition which imposes itself upon him, "he will affirm that under the sensible data, alone accessible to his process of study there are hidden realities, the essence of which cannot be grasped by it; that these realities are ranged in a certain order of which physical science cannot have any direct view; but that physical theory, through its successive elaboration, tends to range experimental laws in an order more and more analogous to the transcendental order according to which realities are classified; that, in this manner, physical theory gradually advances towards its ideal form which is that of a natural classification." Hence, "he affirms that the order, in which mathematical symbols are ranged to constitute the physical theory, is a reflexion, clearer and clearer, of an analogical order according to which inanimated things are classified."¹⁴ "It would be unreasonable to work at the progress of the physical theory, if this theory was not the reflexion clearer and clearer, and more and more precise of a metaphysical system; belief in a transcendental order is the only *raison d'être* of the physical theory."¹⁵ What does this mean but that the

¹⁴ *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, Nov., 1905. "Physique de croyant."

¹⁵ *Revue générale des sciences pures et appliquées*, 18 Janv., 1908. What then is to be thought, as far as Professor Duhem is concerned,

physical theory is not a free construction of our mind but it is imposed in its elements and controlled in its formation and in its progressive advance by data independent of us. No doubt, the physical theory remains always imperfect and always more or less hypothetical and provisory. Its history is full of groupings and hesitations, of innumerable and successive corrections and this shows the imperfection of the human mind and leaves room for the intervention of freedom; yet this history is made up also of invariable elements and progressive continuity in a well determined sense, and this shows the existence of an object which is the source and directive element of the suggestions and operations which contribute to the formation of the physical theory. Professor Duhem as a physicist does not dare to say however that the physical theory has an objective value, that it represents an objective reality; this is a proposition which he affirms as a metaphysician. We cannot help believing that there is here an excessive scruple in this separation of the two domains and we do not believe that the physicist goes beyond his right when considering the results of his observations and experiments and, applying to them the

of this passage from Professor James: "Just now, if I well understand the matter rightly we are witnessing a curious reversing to the common sense way of looking at physical nature, in the philosophy of science favored by such men as Mach, Ostwald and Duhem. According to these teachers, no hypothesis is truer than any other in the sense of being a more literal copy of reality. They are all but ways of talking on our part to be compared solely from the point of view of their use. The only literally true thing is reality and the only reality we know, is for these logicians, sensible reality, the flux of our sensations and emotions as they pass." (*Pragmatism*, Lect. v, pp. 190-1.) We believe that nothing is farther from Professor Duhem's thought. He is in no way a phenomenist, as the passages and articles just cited plainly show, nor a pragmatist. If he speaks of the influence of our needs on the development and the constitution of the sciences, he means the direct influence of our intellectual needs; coherence, clearness, etc., and this is not pragmatism. And if he speaks of divers theories as being neither true nor false, it is because to his mind, from the merely scientific point of view, the question of the objective correspondence between physical theories and reality does not exist. It is, for him, a question of metaphysics or philosophy; and, as a philosopher, Duhem affirms the existence of such a correspondence.

principle of causality, he draws this general conclusion that these data by their characters prove the existence of an objective order. This would be his last word, we grant; but he has the right to pronounce this word; he has laid down the premises; he has the right to draw the conclusion. Would a refusal to go that far arise from the fact that this operation rests on the principle of causality which is preëminently a metaphysical principle? But is the principle of non-contradiction less metaphysical? and does not Professor Duhem admit that it is at every step the guiding principle of reflexion in the study of Physics? It is so because, in reality, in all investigation one has to be more or less of a metaphysician. One can nowhere escape the influence of these two principles; they are to be found at the basis of every science and Physics does not become Metaphysics because it uses them; undoubtedly it remains physics as long as it restricts the application of them to purely physical phenomena; but it is still physics when, considering their characters and the characters of their relations, it concludes to the existence of an objective reality and ontological order; the study of the nature of this reality and of this order constitutes properly the metaphysics of the organic world or cosmology. Prof. Duhem, as a well informed historian of the sciences, is no doubt struck with the numerous fluctuations of theories; we grant that such fluctuations have existed; we admit that a theory rarely reaches its complete perfection; it is almost always subject, under the influence of new discoveries, to perfection and even to correction; but, on the other hand, he does not ignore the fact that there are in it stable elements which are preserved and perfected more and more in a determined sense; we say then that such a permanent stability with such a progressive continuity proves the existence of an objective reality and the existence of the correspondence between our physical theories and this reality. They represent truly, though inadequately this reality, and we add that they explain it in the measure in which they represent it.

What then, shall be the conclusions of this study on the value of science?

First of all, Science, considered even from a scientific point of view, is not a matter of freedom; it is imposed upon us, but we coöperate in its acceptance by us. The definitive results are, from their nature, independent of us and determined by the data of experience. In the process of acquisition our mind has a certain initiative; it has to use its resources of imagination and is subject to certain groupings and waverings, but here again in spite of a certain freedom in the hypotheses, its faculty of selection is at the beginning limited to the data of common sense, controlled more and more, and finally strictly determined by experience. Thus, reality furnishes the data of knowledge, directs and controls its formation in us. Our mind coöperates by adapting itself to the reality; it puts forth its activity in order to perceive these data accurately; it adapts itself to the direction and control of experience in order to assimilate reality more thoroughly. Scientific concepts are not then artificial constructions built by our mind, they are a representation in our mind of the objective reality. The purpose of these concepts is not to be a representation of concrete facts or of their individual relations, but representations of their essential elements and of their invariable relations, that is to say, abstract and general representations.

Scientific concepts are more or less relative, not in a subjective or symbolical sense which would be a negation or the ignoring of a true correspondence between our knowledge and objective reality, nor in the sense that we impose upon experience some forms or categories of our minds, but in the objective sense that we reach reality only in the measure in which our human mind is capable of perceiving it and according to the processes that are co-natural to it, and according to the degree of perfection with which men, throughout the ages, use these processes. In this sense, to say that our scientific concepts are relative is simply to admit that they do not take in the whole reality and that they do not take it in all at once; they represent it exactly in the measure in which they represent it, but this representation is not absolutely adequate.¹⁶ Hence our

¹⁶ Cf. S. Thomas, *quæst. disp. de anima* 9. 1a. 10 ad 14; *Contra gent.* 1, 3; etc. . . .

scientific knowledge is dynamic and progressive,¹⁷ that is to say, it becomes more and more adequate to reality through a better and more complete adaptation of the mind, an adaptation which implies, in its effort to exist, errors and corrections, moments of incertitude and hesitation. This adequation, moreover, becomes more and more difficult as we go farther and deeper in our study of nature and its universal relations; it is more difficult for laws than for facts; for theories than for laws, but in the measure in which they exist, they are representations of reality and in this measure also they are explanations of it. Hence our scientific concepts in the measure in which they are definitely acquired are not free nor contingent; they are not what we wish them to be; they are what they are and cannot, nature being what it is, be otherwise than they are, although they may become more and more perfect and more and more adequate; their ultimate criterion is not a convention but reality.

Finally, science has not only, nor even primarily, a practical value, but it has first of all a value as knowledge. Undoubtedly sciences, physical sciences in particular, have a value of utilization which is very great; but this is from the scientific point of view, only a consequence, or, so to speak, a happy accident at which the scientist rejoices but which he does not always look for. It is true that if he thinks of these practical results, they may be for him the stimulus that excites, sustains and guides him in his search after truth; they may influence him as regards the aspect or the degree of the truth to be reached; but they do not influence in any way the nature of that truth; moreover, practical results once obtained, are for him the means of verification or a sign of truth, but they do not constitute its nature. Besides, practical results themselves in our moral or material life are not recognized as such, that is to say, as really good and practical, except through a higher criterion anterior to, and distinct from, them that makes us know them as good in themselves; and this is an intellectual point of view. The scientist judges of the truth of a doctrine

¹⁷ Cf. S. Thomas, *De Natura Verbi*, c. 1.

or of a proposition, by its coherence, by its clearness, by the recognition of its agreement with what ought to be or with that which is,—briefly, by evidence; and this is what enables him to foresee the results before having obtained them.

Such is the true value of science, in the measure in which it is realized or acquired. It is an objective representation, exact, although inadequate, explanatory of reality in the measure in which it is representative of it. But it is or can be neither the definitive and absolute explanation of all things, as some would like us to believe, for it needs for its foundations and for its progress and it demands after its last conclusions some principles and reflections superior to its own; nor is it a merely arbitrary and symbolical schema, for it puts us in contact with reality and gives us some explanatory, though fragmentary, knowledge of it.

From all this it is easy to grasp the true relations that unite science and philosophy or metaphysics; to see the flaw and, at the same time, its source in the New Philosophy when it ignores the continuity between Science and Philosophy. It would be indeed a gross injustice to Professor Bergson to say that he does not care about sciences; he is very well informed about them and he thinks rightly that the study of them is of primary importance to the philosopher; but to him, sciences furnish through their concepts, material for knowledge rather than knowledge, and even artificial schemas rather than true representations. We maintain the contrary. We consider his interpretation of science as false. His error on this point is, in great part, due to a false notion of intuition and of its place in human knowledge.

It is this last theory, the theory of intuition in the New Philosophy, that we shall now examine.

(To be continued.)

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THE BEGINNINGS OF LUTHERANISM.

When Father Denifle died on the 10th of June, 1905, only the first volume of his monumental work, *Luther und Lutherthum*,¹ had appeared. This volume, it will be remembered, created a greater sensation and attracted more attention than any work of its kind since the publication of Doellinger's *History of the Reformation*. One month after its publication the entire first edition was exhausted and it became necessary for Father Denifle to prepare a second edition for the press. In the Foreword to the second edition he says, "Contrary to all expectations I am obliged to prepare a second edition of my first volume, at a time when I supposed I would be employed in writing the second volume. I had no intention of casting a firebrand among the people, but merely to write a work for scholars in simple and unmistakable honesty and truthfulness. I had supposed that appealing thus to a rather limited clientèle a considerable time would elapse before the first edition would be exhausted, pending which I would have ample time to prepare the second volume for publication. But matters took a different turn. Thanks to the interest which Catholics as well as Protestants manifested in my work the first edition was entirely exhausted within a month's time."

The material for the entire work had been collected and was ready at hand, needing but the leisure time of the historian to throw it into shape for publication. But before this could be done Death came and put a quietus upon the searching mind and robbed the busy hand forever of its cunning. Father Denifle was dead and the masterpiece of his life stood unfinished. There are many Dominicans who are qualified by reason of special equipment along these lines to undertake

¹ *Luther und Lutherthum in der ersten Entwicklung*. Quellenmässig dargestellt von P. Heinrich Denifle, O. P., und P. Albert Maria Weiss, O. P. Zweiter Band, bearbeitet von Albert Maria Weiss, O. P. Verlag von Kirchheim & Co., Mainz. 8vo. 514 pages. Price, unbound, 7 marks; bound, marks 9.50.

the completion of Father Denifle's work, but among these the ablest and the most distinguished is he whom the Master General of the Dominicans has appointed the literary executor of Denifle, the Reverend Albert Maria Weiss, O. P., Professor of Apologetics and Sociology at the University of Freiburg, Switzerland. Of this appointment Father Weiss says:

"No one who is pleased to bring out his own productions will ever be specially delighted with the task of completing a work begun by another. Where the unfinished work brings with it a "*beneficium inventarii*" of such unpleasant character as that with which Father Denifle's last work is charged, the outlook is all the more forbidding. Indeed I was not enamored of the prospect and I reflected again and again. Finally, I agreed to accept the literary legacy of the deceased, yielding to the solicitations of his friends and mine, but above all was I swayed by a feeling of brotherly affection which I cherished for him. By the dispensation of Divine Providence it fell to my lot to assist him in his last agony, to close his eyes in death and to receive his last sigh. This last, soft, slow sigh of the energetic man sank quite into the depths of my soul in such an inforgettable way that I could not possibly refuse anything which is asked of me in his name and for his sake. So then for his sake I suppress my disinclination and accept the trust. Emoluments will come therefrom—I recognize them in advance—they will not be overpleasant. But I mean to accept them with becoming grace and offer them up for the needs of his soul." ²

So Father Weiss accepted the trust and became the literary executor of Father Denifle. In 1906, one year after Father Denifle's death he published the second part of the first volume of *Luther und Lutherthum*. His contribution to this volume was chiefly of an editorial nature. In the same year he published, *Lutherpsychologie als Schlüssel zur Luther Legende*. He calls this a supplement to the first volume. At the time of its appearance this work received the most respectful atten-

² A. M. Weiss, O. P., *Lutherpsychologie*; Denifle, *Luther und Lutherthum*—Supplement. Vol. II.

tion of the critics and was accorded extraordinary praise, being considered by some the gem of the whole set of Luther studies which the work of Father Denifle has called into being. It is not our present purpose to consider Father Weiss's *Lutherpsychologie* and we make a reference to it only because the volume under present consideration devotes itself in a masterly way to the proof of the Thesis which Father Weiss formulates in the last paragraph of his *Lutherpsychologie*. (Page 212).

"Even Protestantism, which is only a branch of the Reformation, does not stand or fall with the person of Luther. Luther is the loudest spokesman in the introduction of Protestantism, this claim probably no one will dispute. Beyond this he has no significance."

"Protestantism is a fragment of the Reformation, the Reformation a fragment of Humanism, or rather let us say, Secularization, and the Secularization of that time paved the way for the Secularism with which the world at the present time is so earnestly engaged."

"These thoughts I shall develop in the second volume."

The second volume is now before us and its publication finishes the great study of *Luther and Lutheranism* which Father Denifle began and which Father Weiss has so gloriously completed.

To the student who takes up this volume, the sigh of relief in the first sentence of the foreword is distinctly audible. The author says: "With sincere thanks to Almighty God I finish the work which came to me as an unpleasant legacy through the death of the unforgettable Denifle. Never would I have undertaken the work by my own volition. But in my case are realized the words of another who says: 'When you were younger you did gird yourself and you walked the ways of your own choosing, but now that you are older you shall stretch forth your arms and another will gird you and lead you along the way you do not wish to go.' Well this other has by a circuitous path brought me back to the beginnings of my youth and has graciously vouchsafed to me to see the completion of my undertakings and those of another. To Him

who has mercifully granted the beginning and the end I render first and foremost the unqualified tribute of my grateful heart."

Well may he give thanks and feel a sense of relief, for the undertaking was one of exceeding difficulty and he has acquitted himself of it most excellently.

It had been generally supposed that Father Weiss would use the notes and the matter which Father Denifle had collected, but in this he has acted contrary to expectations. He has given us a psychological study of Lutheranism as in the previous volume he has given us a psychological study of Luther.

Concerning this he says in his foreword. "I have made no use whatsoever of the very rich collection of material which I found in Denifle's literary effects. A volume constructed from this matter would necessarily have a very different character from that which I had proposed to myself as a harmonious complement to the already published portion of the Luther study."

"The Denifle matter will supply a fine basis for a supplementary volume upon the moral situation previous to the Reformation."

Father Weiss quietly suggests that at another time this matter may be thrown into shape and given to the public. But the present volume does not bring any new matter to the reader. It is a critical study of facts already known and admittedly true. It is the judgment of a scholar, a philosopher, a theologian and above all of a great historian upon the far-reaching movement known as "Lutherthum."

The Author says. "In the work which I undertook it did not seem to me to be desirable to pile up newly discovered literature but rather was it important that existing facts should receive proper consideration and that the dominant ideas should be clearly and unmistakably set forth. In this endeavor the piling up of matter which is rather detached and isolated would, it seems to me, be a hindrance rather than an aid to an unbiased and thorough study of the movement. To be sure one must study the sources, nay more, one must study into the sources and where there is so much passion and prejudice at work as there is in our subject matter, it is necessary to go behind the sources, and a long way behind, at that.

"For this reason I have absolutely refrained from looking up any new matter, *that* at hand is rich and ample. What is of prime importance, however, is a thorough study, a sifting and an analysis of all the historical antecedents and circumstances from which the Reformation took its rise. For such a study the matter at hand is all-sufficient.

"The premises from which the following examinations proceed are these: that the development of the Reformation was entirely human and followed along ordinary lines of human development. The Reformation did not fall from heaven a supernatural revelation, it did not spring full-fledged from the head of Luther as Minerva sprang from the head of Jove. It is not a necessary evolution in the march of events in the world's history, nor a manifestation of a change in the world spirit.

"Poetical and mystical dreams concerning the emancipation of conscience, all these will be left out of consideration. All that we propose is a sober examination of historical facts, from which it will appear that Lutheranism is but the natural conclusion of natural premises. The future will reveal the fact whether or not the Author has written and judged wisely and well. What has herein been given to the public is the product of an honest effort to know and discover the truth.

"Whatever may be thought of the work now happily brought to a close one thing is certain: that henceforth no one will write of Luther without a more thorough knowledge of the Middle Ages and of Scholasticism, nor of the Reformation and Lutheranism without a more minute consideration of the teachings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries which were so hostile to the Church. The time has gone by forever when persons writing of the Reformation will hold themselves exempt from the observance of the laws of historical criticism."

This volume is divided into six parts, each part is devoted to an exhaustive study of one phase of the great movement. In the first part the Author considers the condition of affairs which brought on the Reformation.

The *Second Part* devotes itself to the teachings of Lutheranism in its beginnings.

The *Third Part* treats of the transition from Lutheranism to Protestantism. It became evident as time went on that if the Reformation wished to secure for itself an abiding existence it must have a formulated creed, some sort of a dogmatic basis which would lend to it at least an appearance of separate individual existence apart from the Church against which it proposed for all time to stand in hostile attitude. The position of absolute and all-round denial which constituted the sum-total of Lutheranism, made anything like permanence impossible. At this juncture it became plainly apparent that Luther had not the ability to meet the requirements of the situation. The task was therefore entrusted to one far abler than Luther,—*Melanchthon*.

Melanchthon, as well as the rest, saw that the hypnotic influence which Luther had been exercising upon the populace was dying a certain death and that something must be done and quickly done, to avert the disintegration which was becoming alarmingly manifest. Melanchthon stepped to the front, took up the leadership, and *Lutheranism* was at an end and *Protestantism* had begun.

The *Fourth Part* considers in an interesting and searching manner,—The Spirit of Lutheranism,—*separation, breaking asunder, destruction*, these are the marks of Lutheranism. Follow the trend of the Reformation and you will see that its special object and aim was to reverse absolutely all Gospel precepts and its rule of conduct, this; that whatever God had joined must be rent asunder; separation in all things,—separation between the Church and Christianity, separation between Christianity and Religion, separation between Christianity and Life, separation between faith and works, separation between faith and reason, separation between grace and coöperation, separation between fear and love, separation between love and justice, separation between the Church and Matrimony, separation between penance and satisfaction, separation between freedom and law, separation between justification and remission of sins,—in fine, separation between the natural and the supernatural and herein lies the spirit of Lutheranism.

In the *Fifth Part* we find a careful study of the sources

of Lutheranism and our Author fixes them in the following paragraph.

"Thus we assign as the chief sources of Lutheranism the following,—Nominalism, Husitism, Gallicanism and Humanism—all borrowed from alien soil. German sources are not excluded, especially the false Mysticism and the older heretics, but they stand relatively in the background and can only be considered as reserves."

In a most satisfactory manner the author traces from each of these sources a stream, which several streams at the point of confluence combined to form that deluge which swept its havoc and ruin not only over Germany but over all Europe as well.

The achievement of Lutheranism forms the subject matter of the sixth, the last part of this truly great work.

The most important outcome lies in the historical proof of the truth that the return of Protestantism to Lutheranism proclaims the triumph of modern ideas and that the so-called Modernism waxes strong precisely in the degree in which Lutheranism reappears.

In the "Nachwort" which the Author adds to his study he states pithily that the only "regula fidei" of Lutheranism is the *odium Papae*. The system contained no positive teaching whatsoever. Every adherent was permitted to adjust his personal Christianity quite to his own liking, the only requirement being that it be *Churchless, Romeless and Antipapist*.

ALBERT REINHART, O. P.

THE ACTS OF THE MARTYRS.

Works of reference: Ruinart, *Praefatio Generalis in Acta primorum Martyrum sincera* (Ratisbon, 1859); Le Blant, *Les Actes des Martyrs*, Supplément aux Acta Sincera de Dom Ruinart (Paris, 1882); Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, Vol. II. (Freiburg, 1903); Harnack, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1893); *Id.* *Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1897, 1904); Neuman, *Der Römische Staat und die allgemeine Kirche*, Vol. I. (Leipzig, 1890); Ehrhard, *Die altchristliche Literatur und ihre Erforschung* (Freiburg, 1900); Krumbacher, *Geschichte der Byzantinischen Literatur* (München, 1897); Delehaye, S. J., *Les légendes hagiographiques* (Brussels, 1896); Dufoureq, *Étude sur les Gesta Martyrum Romains* (Paris, 1900); Van den Gheyn, "Acta Martyrum," in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Vol. I. (Paris, 1903); Leclercq, "Actes des Martyrs," in *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, Vol. I. (Paris, 1907).

Among the documents of early ecclesiastical history, or to be more restrictive, among the hagiographic records, there are perhaps none more interesting or none more venerable than the acts of the Martyrs. In a simple and vivid style they describe to us the trials and sufferings of the early witnesses of our faith at a time when the Church in its infancy was struggling for recognition with the authorities of the Roman Empire, and in the combat offered up the blood of many of her children, which was at once the seal of her right to existence and the seed of new generations of Christians. These documents gathered up and put together formed the subject of edification for the generations of faithful that succeeded each other during the course of centuries. By reading them the Christians tried to draw therefrom inspirations of strength and fortitude if similar

trials should befall them, or at least lessons of patience and other Christian virtues in times of peace and tranquillity.

The Church encouraged her children thus to make use of these precious documents, because since a very early date the Acts of the Martyrs were read during the liturgical services, at least in many places.

The Acts of the Martyrs may be said to be the records or the accounts of the trials, the sufferings, and the death of those Christians who were prosecuted for their belief in Christ. Different names were given to these records, such as *Acta*, *Gesta*, or *Passiones*; the first one was taken from the official report of the proceedings, more properly called *Acta*. In the large amount of *Acta* or *Passiones*, which the piety of the Christian generations has handed down to us, a division or classification is absolutely necessary; for not all of them are of the same kind nor are they all of equal merit. And since they present themselves in the shape of historical documents, the most reasonable classification will be the one, which divides them according to their historical value or according to the intrinsic force which they possess as testimonies of the past.

Several scholars like Le Blant in his *Les Actes des Martyrs* or Bardenhewer in his *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (Vol. II.), distinguish two or three classes of *Acta* or *Gesta Martyrum*. The first section consists of those records strictly called *Acta*, which contain either the official report made of the trials by the officers of the Court in charge of the proceedings or at least, a faithful reproduction of the same with but slight additions, variations or modifications made by the hands of the Christians. The second category embraces those records more properly called *Gesta* or *Passiones*, written by contemporary Christians, who either were personal witnesses to the trial or else had other reliable information on the subject. The third class finally takes in all those accounts, which, being of a much later date than the events related, were made after a more ancient model or were based on uncertain traditions or even on the pure imagination of the writer.

The learned Bollandist writer, Hippolyte Delehaye, in his *Les légendes hagiographiques*, is more specific in his classi-

fication, and enumerates six different categories of Acts of Martyrs.

The first two categories coincide with the first two of the division already spoken of, with the addition that the second is subdivided into three classes. As a matter of fact, the writer in the case may speak either in his own name and record what he himself saw, or else he may write down the testimony of eye-witnesses, or else he may combine his own experiences with what others told him about the event. In the third category he places those acts, the principal source of which is a written document belonging to either the first or second category modified by the writer according to the exigencies of the literary form or of other circumstances whatsoever.

To the fourth class, he assigns those of the Gesta, which combine a few real and historical elements with a purely imaginary narrative. The fifth category contains those Gesta, in which the historic element is entirely excluded, and all is pure invention of the resourceful imagination of the writer. Finally, the sixth category comprises the forgeries written for the purpose of deceiving the reader. This classification is more complete and exhaustive than the preceding one, and received with but a slight modification, the approval of Professor Harnack in his *Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius*, Vol. II., pp. 464-65, note 3. Something more must be said for a better understanding of these various categories.

The first category, as mentioned above, comprises the Acts containing the official account of the trial by the court in charge of the case. While the trial of a martyr was going on, all the various incidents connected with it were written down on tablets by certain employes of the Court, known as Notarii, and when the document was completed, it was deposited in the archives of the proconsul or Governor of the Province, and access to these public Acts, generally at least, was permitted to all. These official records contained as a rule the date, *i. e.* the year and the day of the trial; the account of the arrest of the Martyrs and their presentation to the Judge, proconsul or other; the verification of their name, of their family, of their social status,

and of their native land; the interrogatory concerning their faith; the admonitions or threats addressed to them by the Judge; the tortures inflicted on them; the reading of the sentence by the presiding Judge or his herald (*praeco*), and finally the execution. Such documents were of inestimable value to the Christians; and hence they were anxious to secure copies of the same from the employes of the Magistrate. If they were unable to obtain them in the regular way, they resorted to bribing the officers in charge of the archives. Of the purely official acts of the Martyrs there is not a single copy extant; but there are several examples of Acts taken from the official records and but slightly modified by the Christians. According to the general judgment of scholars the best of this class are the "*Acta Proconsularia Sancti Cypriani*," and the "*Acta Proconsularia Martyrum Scillitanorum*." The first relate the martyrdom of St. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage in Africa, which occurred the 14th of September, 258, during the reign of the Emperor Valerian (253-60); in reality they contain three distinct parts: viz. an interrogatory to which the Saint was submitted in 257, and in consequence of which he was exiled, the trial of the year 258, and finally the account of his execution. The other Acts relate the martyrdom of a number of Christians from the town of Scilli in Numidia, Africa, which occurred in Carthage the 17th of July 180, during the reign of the Emperor Commodus (180-92). They exhibit perhaps an even greater purity of the original proconsular Acts than those of St. Cyprian.

The second category of Acts contains the account of Martyrdoms narrated by contemporary Christians, who were either present at the scene or else obtained their information from reliable eye-witnesses. A trial for a criminal offence conducted by a proconsul or other Roman judge always attracted a large crowd of spectators. The same, and perhaps in a greater degree, was the case with the trial of a Christian, the profession of Christianity being looked upon as one of the greatest crimes that could be committed against the safety of the Empire. Among the multitude there was generally a number of Christians, who were not attracted by idle or morbid curiosity; they went there either to encourage their suffering brethren with

their presence, or else to receive comfort and strength from the example of the Martyrs. And often, after the trial was over, the Christians who had witnessed it, wrote down or related to others the various incidents connected with it.

Perhaps the best specimens of such *Gesta* or *Passiones* are found in the letters written by the Church of Smyrna on the martyrdom of St. Polycarp and in that written by the Churches of Vienne and Lyons on the persecution in their midst. The martyrdom of St. Polycarp occurred at Smyrna on the 23rd of February, 155, during the reign of the Emperor Antoninus Pius (138-61). Many of the Christians were spectators of the scene; and one of them, probably a certain Marcus or Marcion, wrote a full account of it together with a description of the death of some other martyrs. The narrative in the form of a letter was sent in the name of the Church of Smyrna to the Church of Philomelium in Phrygia with the request to forward it to the brethren of other Churches. Most of this precious document was inserted by Eusebius in his ecclesiastical history (iv, 15). During the reign of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-80) viz. within the years 177-78, the Christian community of Lyons in Gaul was visited with a severe persecution; and while it lasted a number of Christians, among them a certain Vettius Epagathus, the deacon Sanctus of Vienne, the slave Blandina, and the aged Bishop Pothinus of Lyons, were put to death. When the storm had somewhat subsided the communities of Vienne and Lyons wrote up an account of the matter and sent it to the brethren in Asia and Phrygia. The full text of the letter was found in the collection of the Acts of Martyrs made by Eusebius, and copious extracts from it are still to be read in his ecclesiastical history (v, 1-4).

The third category comprises those acts, in which the principal source is a written document belonging to either of the two preceding categories, modified in some manner by the writer.

The documents relating to the history of the Martyrs have at all times attracted the writers interested in that glorious episode of the Church's life, and the contemporaries as well as those of later ages have tried to exercise their literary gifts

by embodying in their compositions extracts or fragments of that kind. As examples of such acts we may quote those of St. Justin and, in a certain sense, at least, those of the Saints Perpetua and Felicitas. St. Justin Martyr, the philosopher and apologist of the second century, was put to death with six other Christians in Rome within the years 163-67; the trial was conducted and the sentence was pronounced by Junius Rusticus, then prefect of Rome. The Acts in their present form are not contemporary, but they embody what appears to be the official account of the proceedings in the case. And in the opinion of scholars, such as Harnack in his "*Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur*, Vol. I, pp. 282-83, they are genuine as to their substance. The martyrdom of the Saints Perpetua and Felicitas with several others occurred on the 2nd of March, 202 or 203, in the Province of Africa. The writer of their acts, who was an eye-witness himself, incorporated in his narrative the notes written down by two of the martyrs, Perpetua and Saturus, during their imprisonment; and for this reason the Acts may be classed in this category. Several of the acts contained in the collection made in the Tenth century by Symeon Metaphrastes reproduce documents of the kind described; and therefore, in spite of alterations or modifications, must be assigned to this section.

The fourth category comprises those acts, in which the historical elements, as a rule rather few, are combined with a narrative invented by the imagination of the writer. The account is usually derived from uncertain popular traditions; from literary reminiscences, or other circumstances; and the historic foundation is usually reduced to the name of the Martyr, his tomb, and the anniversary date of his feast. The number of such Acts is exceedingly large; and practically all the documents contained in the legendary cycles of Roman Martyrs belong to this class. Although the inner value of these Acts is rather small with regard to the history of the Martyrs, still, they are important for a twofold reason. Their topographical references to tombs, sanctuaries, or the like, are as a rule very exact; and often these indications have guided the steps of the Roman archeologists in their researches. Then again, once the age of

the documents is determined, they furnish valuable information on the customs, usages, beliefs, or other circumstances of that time.

The fifth category comprises those Acts, which exclude entirely the historic element and rest exclusively on the imagination of the writer. And if such compositions are written for the purpose of deceiving the reader, they constitute a special category, the sixth one. The Acts belonging to these categories are not so very numerous; and often it will be difficult to distinguish the one class from the other.

With regard to the historical value of these various classes of Acts of Martyrs, it is evident from their description, that only the first three categories can be placed among the genuine historical documents; and their importance is in the order, in which they were enumerated. As to what may be retained of the others, or as to what information may be gained from them, is a question, which cannot be answered in a general way. Each document must be examined separately, and the various elements of its composition must be carefully sifted. So likewise the question as to which Acts are genuine and which are not, must be answered for each document in particular; and the general rules of historical criticism will guide the student in this regard. In general, however, the simplicity of style, the frank and open attitude of the Martyrs, the absence, or at least the scarcity of the marvelous element are indications of genuineness.

Before touching upon other points connected with this subject it may be interesting to present here a specimen of genuine Acts of Martyrs. The Acts of St. Justin Martyr will answer this purpose, since they embody in a later modification the official report of the proceedings in the trial. Texts of this document are found in De Otto, *Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum*, Vol. III. (Jena, 1879); in Migne, *P. G.*, Vol. VI, and the Latin version in Ruinart, *Acta Martyrum sincera* (Ratisbon, 1859). The English translation made as literal as possible, reads as follows:

In the time of the unlawful champions of idolatry iniquitous

edicts were published throughout City and Country against the pious Christians, that they should be compelled to make libations to the vain idols. Hence the holy men having been arrested they were conducted to the Prefect of Rome by name Rusticus. When they were presented before the tribunal, the Prefect Rusticus said to Justin: "First believe in the gods, and obey the emperors." Justin said: "To believe in the things ordained by our Saviour Jesus Christ is a blameless act and not to be condemned." The Prefect Rusticus said: "In what branches of knowledge art thou versed?" Justin said: "I tried to learn all systems of knowledge; and I assented to the true teachings of the Christians, although they do not please those who hold erroneous opinions." The Prefect Rusticus said: "Those doctrines then please thee, oh wretch?" Justin said: "Certainly, because I follow them on a correct principle." The Prefect Rusticus said: "What is this principle?" Justin said: "It is the one, by which we revere the God of the Christians, whom we believe one, from the beginning the Maker and Architect of the whole creation, visible and invisible, and the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was preannounced by the prophets, who again will come to mankind, the herald of salvation, and the master of faithful disciples. And I, being a simple man, think that I can say but little things concerning his limitless divinity, avowing that a certain prophetic power is required therefor. Since it was announced about him, whom I said but now to be the Son of God; for I know that the prophets from the beginning have foretold concerning his advent that was among men."

The Prefect Rusticus said: "Where do you assemble?" Justin said: "Wherever the choice and the power permits one. Or dost thou perhaps think that we all gather in the same place? It is not the case; because the God of the Christians is not circumscribed by place, but being invisible, He fills the heaven and the earth, and is adored and glorified everywhere by the Christians." The Prefect Rusticus said: "Tell, where do you come together, or in what place dost thou assemble thy disciples?" Justin said: "I stay over the house of a certain Martin, near the bath surnamed Timiotinon, and for all this

time; (I came to the City of the Romans now for the second time), and I do not know any other gathering-place but that one. And if anyone wishes to come to me, I communicate to him the words of truth." Rusticus said: "Therefore then thou art a Christian?" Justin said: "Certainly, I am a Christian."

The Prefect Rusticus said to Chariton: "Now say, Chariton, art thou also a Christian?" Chariton said: "I am a Christian by the command of God." The Prefect Rusticus said to the woman Charito: "What dost thou say, oh Charito?" Charito said: "I am a Christian by the gift of God." Rusticus said to Evelpistus: "Who art thou?" Evelpistus, a slave of Cæsar, answered: "I also am a Christian, delivered by Christ, and I share in the same hope with the favor of Christ." The Prefect Rusticus said to Hierax: "Art thou also a Christian?" Hierax said: "Certainly, I am a Christian, for I worship and adore the same God." The Prefect Rusticus said: "Did Justin make you Christians?" Hierax said: "I was a Christian, and shall be one." And Paion standing by said: "I also am a Christian." The Prefect Rusticus said: "Who is the one that taught thee?" Paion said: "From my parents I received this beautiful confession." Evelpistus said: "I listened with pleasure to the discourses of Justin, but I also received from my parents the gift of being a Christian." The Prefect Rusticus said: "Where are thy parents?" Evelpistus said: "In Cappadocia." Rusticus said to Hierax: "Thy parents where are they?" And he answered saying: "Our true father is Christ, and the mother is the faith in Him; my earthly parents are dead. And I being departed from Iconium in Phrygia came hither." The Prefect Rusticus said to Liberianus: "What dost thou say; art thou a Christian? Or dost thou worship the gods?" Liberianus said: "I also am a Christian; for I worship and adore the only true God."

The Prefect says to Justin: "Listen thou, who art said to be learned and who thinkest to know the true doctrines, if thou after being scourged be beheaded, believest thou that thou wilt ascend into heaven?" Justin said: "I hope to obtain his gifts, if I suffer these things. For I know that the divine favor remains with those who live thus until the consummation

of the whole world." The Prefect Rusticus said: "Therefore thou surmisest that thou wilt ascend into the heavens in order to receive certain rewards?" Justin said: "I do not surmise but I know it and am convinced of it." The Prefect Rusticus said: "As to the rest, let us come to the proposed and urgent matter. Having come together sacrifice at one time to the gods." Justin said: "No one of a prudent mind falls from piety into iniquity." The Prefect Rusticus said: "If you do not obey, you will be punished without mercy." Justin said: "It is our prayer that we suffering for the sake of our Lord Jesus Christ be saved; because that will be to us salvation and confidence before the terrible and universal tribunal of our Lord and Saviour." In like manner also the other martyrs spoke. "Do what thou wilt, for we are Christians and do not sacrifice to the gods."

The Prefect Rusticus pronounced the sentence saying: "Those that did not wish to sacrifice to the gods, and to comply with the edict of the Emperor, shall be scourged and then be led to suffer capital punishment according to the form of the laws." The holy martyrs glorifying God went out to the accustomed place, were beheaded, and accomplished their martyrdom in the confession of the Saviour. And some of the faithful took secretly their bodies and deposited them in a convenient place, having received the help of the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom glory from ages to ages. Amen.

When speaking of the classification of the Acts of the Martyrs, it was said that the historic value of certain categories is very small or practically *nil*; and hence, they must be considered as legendary. An important question is as to how these legendary accounts arose. The Bollandist writer, Delehaye, has discussed this problem very interestingly in his work *Les Légendes hagiographiques*. There are two factors which concur in the composition of any of these legends; viz. the people with its imaginations and traditions, and the hagiographer or the author who gives a written form to these traditions. The formation of false history or legendary accounts, such as they are produced by the people, are attributable chiefly to a lack of competent knowledge, to a taste for exaggerations and to a

lack of honest truthfulness or sincerity. Even to the individual it is a difficult task to give a correct account of an event, especially if it be of a complex nature. Generally, the mind of man being limited, he does not seize all the sides or all the details of a fact, or else, being unable to dominate by his mind his imagination and his disposition of soul, he gives a colored version of the fact, in which his own imagining and his own feelings are mingled with the reality of things. And hence it arises that we receive often so many different versions of one and the same event, from which it is difficult to grasp the elements of real truth. This phenomenon is true to a greater degree of the intelligence of a multitude or of a people. As a matter of fact, the mind or the intelligence of a people taken collectively is very restricted and, as a rule, is not much influenced by the higher or intellectual classes in its midst. The number of ideas retained is usually small, and these ideas are extremely simple. And thus the heroes or Saints, of whom it keeps the memory are few in number; they do not remain distinct, but the last one inherits all the glory of the preceding ones, and whatever great deed was ever accomplished is attributed to him. The differences of time and place are entirely eliminated. Facts of different epochs and of distant localities are combined together for his greater glorification. In this manner the Saint or the Martyr is taken out of his real surroundings of time and space and becomes a type; as in the history of St. Lawrence it is the type of the Christian martyr that is represented. These considerations will explain how it is that the details in the legends of the Saints or the Martyrs are generally the same in many of the documents; the poverty of the imagination is unable to vary the narrative by new elements. The lack of intelligence in the multitude is the cause, that the people attach more importance to the things of the senses than to those of the mind. Hence the tendency of localizing the history of a Saint or a Martyr, of connecting him with a building, a tree, a fountain, a certain definite place, etc.; of explaining certain things with an incident from his life, as *e. g.* by explaining the cavity of a rock as being his footprints, and the like.

The false interpretation of monuments or names, the quest after the miraculous, or the visible supernatural element, is likewise attributable to this cause. The taste for exaggerations in the multitude is a fact of every day experience. And this leads often to pictorial and striking descriptions of incidents, which very simple in themselves, will not satisfy the imagination of the people except in their transformation. The lack of sincerity is generally caused by questions of local interest, in which the whole community is concerned. And in such circumstances it seems, as if each member of it leaves to his neighbor the task of examining the particulars of what is advanced. This lack of sincerity is particularly evident in the legends of the Saints or Martyrs connected with the origin or foundation of a church.

From the little said so far, we may imagine how the real history of a Saint or Martyr may be transfigured, or even how an account may be formed without any real foundation whatever. To the work of the people is added that of the hagiographer, who puts in writing the account about a Saint or a Martyr. The hagiographer must be classed among the writers of history; for after all he wrote or pretended to write works of history. But the idea which the ancients had of history was entirely different from the one entertained by the scholars of our day. To them it was not a correct account of the events of the past, but rather a literary composition, in which the series of events was merely a pretext for the exercise of oratorical and poetical gifts. And hence it is no wonder if the hagiographers felt rather free in arranging the facts concerning their hero, because after all their principal aim was literary style or the edification of the reader. There is another circumstance to be considered. Of all the sources at the disposal of the hagiographer: written works, oral tradition, or monuments, he chose more frequently from the popular traditions, which from the historic standpoint, are less controllable but satisfy more the taste of the multitude. And if he drew from reliable sources, it often happened, that a wrong interpretation was given to the material at hand; and thus it became useless. Finally when the sources proved to be altogether deficient, then the hagiographer resorted

to other means by giving descriptions of a general character of the period and applying the particulars to his hero; by adapting the biography of another Saint or Martyr to his hero, or finally by transcribing entire passages from one or several writers and combining them with other elements so as to suit his hero. When such elements are at work over certain data of history or even without them, the result can be only such as is actually seen in the legendary Acts of Martyrs.

A practical illustration as to how these legends concerning the Martyrs arose, how they were developed in the course of ages, and how they were put in writing is found in the learned work of Albert Dufourcq, *Étude sur les Gesta Martyrum Romains* (Paris, 1900). The author endeavored to trace the origin and the history of the legendary cycles of Roman Martyrs. He comes to the conclusion that all were written a long time after the age of the persecutions, and that all belong to about the same period. They were elaborated during the fifth and sixth centuries, during the time of the Ostrogothic domination in Italy. And they are about contemporary to the lives of the popes as contained in the *Liber Pontificalis*. Of course, some of them are even of a later date. The causes that were directly responsible for their composition were on the one hand the worship of the Martyrs, which assumed such vast proportions in the fourth and fifth centuries; on the other, the practice or profession of asceticism, which culminated in the virtue of chastity. Other circumstances had their share in bringing about the composition of the *Gesta Martyrum*, and traces of them are found in the text; such as theological controversies concerning the errors of the Manicheans, the Pelagians, and the Monophysites, as well as reminiscences of the Byzantine empire. The material of the *Gesta* was taken not from reliable written sources, but rather from the uncertain popular traditions connected with the Roman cemeteries or other places of interest and devotion in Rome. Similar ideas on this subject were expressed several years previously by the Bollandist writer Delehaye in his "L'Amphithéâtre Flavien et ses environs dans les textes hagiographiques," in *Analecta Bollandiana*, Vol. xvi. (Brussels, 1897).

There remain only a few words to be said about the principal collections of Acts of Martyrs made by both ancient and modern writers. The Greek Church has had several men of distinction, who endeavored to preserve for posterity the Acts of the Martyrs. The first and the foremost among them was the historian Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea in Palestine in the first part of the fourth century. This distinguished writer left two works on the Martyrs. The first one had for its title: "Collection of ancient martyrdoms," and to judge from the various references to it in the ecclesiastical history (iv-15, 47; v. Prooem 2; v. 4, 3; v. 21, 5.) it covered the history of the Martyrs in the universal Church. Unfortunately every trace of the work is lost. The second work, smaller in size, is entitled *On the Martyrs of Palestine* and contains the Acts of those Martyrs who suffered for their faith in Palestine during the last persecution under Diocletian and his associates. It appears usually as an addition to the eighth book of the ecclesiastical history. Another collection was made by Methodius, Patriarch of Constantinople (842-46), but this has likewise perished. About this same time were written the Acts of many Martyrs, who were put to death in the conflict arising over the worship of images. (Cf. Krumbacher, *Byzantinische Litteraturgeschichte*, pp. 193 ff.).

The most important of the later Greek hagiographers is Symeon Metaphrastes, a writer of the second half of the tenth century. His work follows the calendar of the Greek Church, and describes the Acts of the Martyrs or the lives of other Saints according to the day of the month in which their feast was celebrated. A large number of legends was thus united into one book. The writer generally used for his information Acts that existed before him; at times he changed little or nothing; at times he recast the model as to the form of its composition only; and some times also he changed or altered it completely. The most complete edition is found in Migne, *P. G.*, Vol. 114-16. Several other Greek writers of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, made collections of Acts of Martyrs, but none of them attained the celebrity of Metaphrastes (Cf. Krumbacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 203 ff.).

Of the works written in the Latin Church we may quote the following: The Latin poet Prudentius of the fourth century wrote in verse the *Peristephanon*, a book of hymns in fourteen songs, which praise the merits of a number of Martyrs from Spain and Italy (Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 60). St. Gregory of Tours in the sixth century devoted one book of his work "*Septem libri miraculorum*" to the Martyrs, chiefly of Gaul, and entitled it *De gloria Martyrum* (Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 71; *Monum. Germ. Histor. Script. rer. Meroving.*, Vol. 1.). It was also during the course of the sixth century, that the *Liber Martyrum* of Rome was written, which contained the legendary cycles of Roman Martyrs (cf. Dufoureaux, *Étude sur les Gesta Martyrum Romains*, pp. 77 ff.). Anastasius, surnamed Bibliothecarius, a Roman writer of the ninth century, translated a number of Acts of Martyrs from the Greek into the Latin language (Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 129). Flodoard, Canon of the Church of Rheims in the tenth century, wrote a large work in verse, in which he sang the praises of Christ, the Saints, and the Popes of Rome. Many passages of this work treat of the Martyrs (Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 135). James de Voragine, Archbishop of Genoa at the end of the thirteenth century, wrote the *Legenda Sanctorum*, commonly known as the *Legenda aurea*, which became so popular throughout all countries. Editions of it were made very frequently, among others we may mention those of Brunet (Paris, 1843) and of Graesse (Dresden and Leipzig, 1846, 1850).

In more modern times appeared the following compilations containing Acts of Martyrs: In 1476 a large work was published at Milan by B. Mombritius under the title of *Sanctuarium sive Vitae Sanctorum collectae ex codicibus manuscriptis*, which gives the lives of the Saints and Martyrs in alphabetical order. In 1551 appeared in Rome the *Historia de vitis Sanctorum* in eight volumes by Al. Lipomanus, Bishop of Verona. This work served as a model for the publication of the Carthusian Laur. Surius, who in 1570-75, edited at Cologne the *De probatis Sanctorum historiis*, based on the volumes of Lipomanus and other manuscript material. The

work comprises six volumes and is arranged according to the months and days of the ecclesiastical calendar.

The most important publication is that of Th. Ruinart, the *Acta primorum Martyrum sincera* which appeared for the first time in Paris in 1689, and often since; the handiest edition is that of Ratisbon, 1859. The purpose of the learned Benedictine scholar was to present a work, which would contain all and none but genuine Acts of Martyrs. In the opinion of the scholars of our day Ruinart has not fully succeeded in his object. Besides the good and reliable Acts he inserted in his collection a certain number, which ought to be excluded. On the other hand, there are some Acts, discovered since, which should be included.

Very recently a distinguished scholar and critic, E. Le Blant, has endeavored to enlarge the collection of Ruinart considerably by maintaining that a great number of Acts generally believed to be spurious, are merely interpolated, or genuine as to their substance, or at least, contain many things that are true to history, and hence, should be utilized in the history of the Martyrs. He based his contention on the fact otherwise true, that in the Acts commonly rejected as having no authority, there are many incidents, especially those relating to the juridic side of the trial, which are in conformity with the history of the age of the Martyrs; and hence, they seem to belong to that period, or at least, seem to contain a stock of truth. But these reasons are not entirely convincing. In fact, the circumstance noted by Le Blant may be explained in two other ways. It may be that the writers of the Acts in question had before them genuine writings, from which such details were taken. Or also it may be understood by considering that at the time when these spurious Acts were written the ways of the criminal procedure were substantially the same as in the age of the Martyrs. The most complete collection, embracing not only Acts of Martyrs but lives of Saints generally, is that edited by the Bollandist writers of the Society of Jesus under the title of *Acta Sanctorum*, of which the first volume appeared in 1643. It is arranged according to the months and days of the calendar; and the last volume, which appeared in 1894, brings it down

to the fourth day of November. Apart from that since 1882 the Bollandists edit also an addition to the *Acta Sanctorum* under the title of *Analecta Bollandiana*, a periodical in which newly discovered texts or else essays in connection with the lives of the Saints or the Acts of the Martyrs are published. Outside of the Bollandists there is a large number of other scholars, who devote their time to the study of the Acts of the Martyrs. A fairly accurate account of the work done in that line may be found in Ehrhard: *Die altchristliche Litteratur und ihre Erforschung*, Vol. I, pp. 539 ff. Syrian and Persian Acts were published by St. Evod. Assemani under the title: *Acta Martyrum orientalium et occidentalium* (Rome, 1778); and more recently by P. Bedjan: *Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum* (Paris and Leipzig, 1890-95). Armenian texts of Acts of Martyrs were published by the Mechitarist Fathers of Venice (Venice, 1874). Coptic Acts of Martyrs were published by H. Hyvernât under the title: *Les Actes des Martyrs de l'Égypte* (Rome, 1886-87). A large number of single Acts are published apart. A description of these is given by Ehrhard in the work and passage referred to.

The Acts of the Martyrs are most interesting relics of ancient Christian literature. Their study presents many and intricate problems, which the best talent among the scholars of the present day endeavors to solve. And if the result seems to favor the genuineness of only a small number, this scarcity is compensated by the inner worth of those that are in this class. Their simplicity and beauty never fail to move the soul of a Christian reader.

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4

A NEW SYNTHESIS IN ETHICS.

It is with a feeling rather of curiosity than of expectation that the hardened student of ethics takes up a book that promises any original thought in ethical construction. The old materials, without increase or diminution, that were at the disposal of Aristotle and Epicurus, are still ready to the hand of any one ambitious to invent. But the task has been tried so often that any fresh production, if it possess any cohesion at all, is pretty sure to be but a revival of some well known design, more or less modified in unessential detail. A recent little volume, however, whose modest title¹ wins in advance the goodwill of the reader, offers a plan which possesses some originality. But the originality consists in ignoring the first limitations inexorably imposed, by the nature of the case, upon all competitors. This condition is that the ultimate determinant of morality must be found either in the results of action as computed in terms of pleasure or utility, or else in some factor of man's moral nature in virtue of which the dividing line between right and wrong is fixed, prior to the mere consequences of action. Make your choice, the *good* or the *pleasurable*, as the end of conduct; but under penalty of incurring the proverbial fate of the man who tries to sit between two stools, do not attempt to combine both on a level of equality. Now this, it seems to us, is just what Mr. Stork has done.

The task which he undertakes is to analyze the nature of moral obligation in its psychological aspect. He begins with a frank profession of thoroughgoing hedonism. Quoting the works in which St. Paul describes the "eternal conflict between duty and bodily appetite," Mr. Stork affirms that this conflict, "on a more careful consideration, will reveal itself as in reality a conflict between different pleasures; for the 'ought' or 'must' of duty, properly understood, is as essen-

¹ *Hints towards a Theory of Ethics.* By Theo. B. Stork. Published for the Author by the Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia.

tially a creation of pleasure and pain as the most sensual of pleasures." Hence, when any one prefers duty to some solicitation of pleasure he is merely making a thoroughly selfish calculation and a thoroughly selfish choice between two pleasures. As our purpose is to expose the inconsistency lurking in Mr. Stork's principles, we shall not stop to urge the fatal objections that have been repeatedly advanced against the doctrine which in defiance of the universal conviction of humanity, obliterates the distinction between selfishness and self-sacrifice; which would say to a mother who is spending herself for her sick child: Madam, the world believes you are worthy of reverence, because your love prompts you to sacrifice your self that it may be well with your infant: but; do not delude yourself; you really do not love your child; you love only yourself. The child is of value in your eyes just so far as, like a new gown or an opera, you can extract some pleasure out of them.

Now let us follow Mr. Stork in his analysis of the feeling of duty, or moral obligation.—"It first emerges into consciousness in the shape of the feeling or perception, or sense which the Ego has the instant it comes in contact with the manifold presented to it in intuition, that it, the percipient Ego and the perceived non-Ego, are parts of one great whole, greater than either and inclusive of both, yet vague, not clearly conceived but only dimly felt." Here, it may be observed in passing, that, as elsewhere, the language savors of monism; but the writer nowhere explicitly commits himself to the identification of the Ego with the whole. This conception of the "ought" he insists upon throughout his exposition. "What makes right or wrong is the sense of obligation, this 'ought' which the Ego feels to serve the unity of the universe—what will produce that unity of the universe is right, and what will produce evil is wrong, because thus the Ego, as was already pointed out, must think the unity of the universe, which its sense of obligation commands it to serve, is to be helped."

We need not remind those familiar with scholastic ethics that this account of the psychological "ought" is not antago-

nistic to the scholastic conception, *i. e.*, that the feeling of "ought" is the impulse of the rational nature to adjust conduct to the universal order. But, whereas we insist that the demands of the universal order, as far as moral conduct is concerned, are written largely in the constitution of human nature Mr. Stork seems to consider that, except the primary impulse of the "ought," the Ego must discover all the rest of the moral law in the world of the non-Ego. Let us proceed with Mr. Stork's exposition. After noting that he defines the primary, radical, moral impulse as a tendency prompting the moral being to a certain line of conduct, namely such conduct as tends to the welfare of the universe, he continues:—The Ego "knowing itself only as a part, it naturally feels itself as subordinate to the whole, regards itself as owing, and the whole as demanding something from it. Thus two ethical impulses or feelings manifest themselves out of which all the rules of duty spring. First, we have the quality of each part to every other, no one part has superior and different rights and obligations from another. Secondly, we have the superiority of the whole to any part; whence not only the duties the individual Ego owes to the whole, but the duties which it owes to other parts of that whole, those duties which, fully developed and defined, are styled altruistic duties; for it is plain that only through the existence of the whole, superior to any part, that any mutual obligations can be established by the parts towards each other." Here we may interrupt for a moment the sequence of Mr. Stork's views to express some reflections that this last statement suggests. It is by no means plain that any moral obligation between the parts can be established by the mere fact that they are parts of the same whole, especially if, as Mr. Stork holds, that the only possible motive for which each individual part can act is its own proper pleasure. And what does Mr. Stork mean by *superior*? Superior in extent or bulk? How can this kind of superiority generate any obligation binding my will? If Mr. Stork means the superiority which generates moral authority; or the right to impose obligations and demands the obedience of my will, he has shown no grounds whatever for his assumption. On the other hand it is very

plain that quite another ground than the one he sets forth for the duties of part to part is conceivable: it is that the Ego and all its fellow parts, as well as the cosmic whole, depend alike on a Supreme Being distinct from them, to whom the moral part owes the duty of obeying that law of conduct which that Being has made existent in the nature of man and the order of the universe. Resuming Mr. Stork's account we find, when treating of altruistic acts, that he passes condemnation on Herbert Spencer for holding that altruistic acts are simply a development of self-pleasing acts; and then he makes the statement: "*other pleasing altruistic acts can never be based, either mediately or immediately upon self-pleasing acts.*" Now this statement is quite consistent with Mr. Stork's theory which describes the "ought" as a primary tendency prompting man to a certain line of conduct and restraining him from an opposite one. But it is absolutely anti-hedonistic; for it implies that the discriminating norm between good and bad is fixed in human nature antecedent to the pleasure and pain standard. And if altruistic action can never spring from self-pleasing action, how can the "ought" which impels to altruism be essentially "a creature of pleasure and pain"?

As if resolved to entangle himself in the deepest slough of hedonism, the author, without any advantage to his theory, assumes the burden of maintaining that pleasures differ only in quantity and not in quality. Hedonists, after Mill, saw that this opinion was the weakest of their weak points; and endeavored to show that they could legitimately adopt the principle that pleasures are to be estimated not merely according to quantity but also according to quality. But for Mr. Stork the pleasures of a good dinner, of listening to a fine opera and of making a heroic self-sacrifice are all of the same quality—there is no higher and lower among them. To speak thus is to become the dupe of abstract terms. Pleasure is a subjective condition attendant upon the satisfaction of tendency, appetite, or desire; and pleasures differ as much as these do among themselves. Each feeling of satisfaction takes its character not, as Mr. Stork holds, merely from the external object which gives the pleasure, but primarily from the nature of the

tendency which is satisfied. The intellectual pleasure attendant upon success in solving a difficult scientific problem differs as much from the feeling of pleasure consequent upon a good meal as the action of the pylorus differs from the act of thinking. Furthermore pleasure differs not merely qualitatively, but also hierarchically. If any one insists that, for example, the pleasure attendant on satisfying the feeling of reverence for parents or the feeling of duty does not manifest itself in his rational nature as different in quality from the feeling of gratified curiosity, we can only say that we believe his introspective processes do injustice to his character.

Let us accept Mr. Stork's hedonistic axiom that the "ought" is the creature of pleasure, that we pursue duty for pleasure's sake alone, and see how it would serve as a basis of conduct. If I prefer the pleasure of intoxication to the pleasure attendant on serving the unity of the universe, what reproach can Mr. Stork address to me? That I have degraded myself by choosing a lower pleasure before a higher one? No: for there is no higher and lower in pleasure. That I have chosen the smaller quantity of pleasure rather than the larger measure? To this I reply that I alone am competent to judge correctly of my consciousness and my choice indicates that for me the pleasure I have preferred is the more pleasurable.

There is another way open to Mr. Stork. Turning his back on hedonism he might stick to his anti-hedonistic principle, and tell me that I have violated the innate impulse of my rational nature to respect the order of the universe, or as he would say, the unity of the universe. But if he does he implicitly makes profession of another ethical creed—that *the good*, not the pleasurable, is the pole to which the magnet of conduct points.

The confusion which pervades the reasoning of these *Hints* is summarized in a single sentence: "In all possible ethical systems there is an undoubted identity of the right with the good, the pleasurable, and of the wrong with the evil, the painful." Here the *good* and *pleasurable* are identified; whereas one is the cause, the other an effect of that cause. To say that

pleasure, the subjective feeling constitutes the nature of the object, that is renders good, the object from which the pleasure flows is akin to saying that the smoke makes the fire. At one time Mr. Stork argues in this strain; at another, he, without fully appreciating the fact, advocates the true view, that the division of conduct into right and wrong is fixed in the order of the universe including the impulses of the Ego, antecedent to any consideration of resulting pleasure and pain, which may attend upon compliance with or deviation from the path of rectitude.

JAMES J. FOX.

NOTES ON EDUCATION.

THE TEACHING OF RELIGION.

In the June number of the *Bulletin* we pointed out some of the general features of the work to be accomplished for the child during his first few days in school and gave in detail a tentative program for the first day. We must now pass on to a brief consideration of the child's

FIRST STEPS IN WRITTEN LANGUAGE.

Neither reading, writing nor spelling appears in the program given for the child's first day in school. The reasons for this omission are obvious. The first thing to be accomplished for the child is to make him feel at home in his new surroundings, and written language in any of its aspects presents too few points of contact with his previous experience to render it desirable material for the child to work upon his first day in school. But just as soon as the children have grown sufficiently familiar with the school environment to give them freedom in the use of their faculties various exercises designed to give them a working knowledge of written language should be taken up. A beginning in this work may usually be made on the third or fourth day.

The program for the first day will, consequently, be profoundly changed before the end of the first week. The principal's talk, the greeting game, and the assignment of places will, of course, be dropped from the program after the first morning and in their places on subsequent days will be found morning prayer, a good morning song, and a morning talk by the teacher. These exercises collectively will occupy about twenty-five minutes and they should be followed by action games designed to rest the children and prepare them for a reading lesson. From this time forward two periods a day

of twenty minutes each should be devoted to reading, one period to sight spelling and one period to dramatic games. In classes of forty or more pupils the children should be divided into two groups. While one of these groups is busy with the reading lesson or sight spelling, the other group should be doing seat work.

The first reading lesson should consist of action words written on the blackboard which the teacher makes use of as signals for the children to perform the actions indicated. Thus, if she writes the word *run* on the blackboard, she should show the children what the chalk says by running, and then she should allow the children to do what the chalk says. After a number of action words, in their written forms, have become familiar to the children simple sentences beginning with action words should be written on the board, *e. g.*, "Run to the door." In this way the children gain a knowledge of the names of objects, etc. After they have learned the meaning of the sentence as a whole, they should be drilled in picking out the parts of a sentence that stand for the different elements.

The sight spelling here recommended is intended to develop a vivid mental image of the word or sentence. The exercises may be conducted in various ways. For example, a familiar word is written on the board which the children are requested to look at intently. The word is then erased and the children are asked to reproduce it. At first it is well that they should observe the teacher as she writes the word and that they should follow the motion of her hand with their own hands as if they were writing the word in the air. The children should then turn to the blackboard and attempt to reproduce the word with the chalk. While the children are thus engaged the teacher observes whether or not a majority of the children are succeeding. If a large number of them are failing, she requests all of them to erase their work and to repeat their observation of her as she reproduces the word. If only a few of the children fail, the teacher should pass from one to another of these children and erase the erroneous words as quickly as possible, writing the word correctly before each child.

In the seat work following this exercise the teacher writes

the word correctly on the children's desks and they are required to outline it over the chalk with pegs. In the subsequent exercises the word is written only on the board and the children are required to copy it on their desks with the pegs. In selecting the material for these exercises both the content and the vocabulary of the child's first book must be kept in mind. For the convenience of the teachers who are using *Religion, First Book*, the complete vocabulary of 782 words used in the book is given, alphabetically arranged, on pages 289-297 of the *Teaching of Religion*, which is intended to fill the place of a teacher's manual. This vocabulary, with very few exceptions, is selected from the spoken vocabulary of the normal English-speaking child of six years of age. A mastery of this vocabulary by the children is, of course, a prerequisite to their understanding of the content of *Religion, First Book*, and to their enjoyment of it.

It has been the custom to prepare the children carefully by drills of various sorts to understand the vocabulary used in the primary reader, while little or no systematic preparation has been made in many of our schools looking towards the mastery of the vocabulary to be employed in the first books in *Christian Doctrine*. In the plan here proposed the truths of the Christian religion are the central themes of the child's first reading book and hence, in preparing him to read and to write, we are at the same time preparing him to understand the fundamental truths of *Christian Doctrine*.

The nature study and the domestic scene are so developed that their content leads the child to an understanding of the purely religious lesson which follows. In like manner, an analysis of the language employed will reveal the fact that the vocabulary used in the nature studies and in the domestic scene constitute a direct preparation for the language in which the religious truths are presented to the child in the *New Testament story* in which each chapter of this book is concluded.

The following analysis of the vocabulary will show the distribution of new words in the written text of the nature study, the home scene and the religious lesson of each of the five chapters of *Religion, First Book*.

DISTRIBUTION OF NEW WORDS IN THE LESSONS.

	Study.	Pages.	Total Number of Words.	Number of New Words.	Percentage of New Words.
I	Nature	7-11	179	87	48.6
	Home	12-15	157	52	33.1
	Religious	16-25	634	150	23.6
II	Nature	28-31	119	28	23.5
	Home	32-37	335	52	16
	Religious	38-39	226	44	19.4
III	Nature	44-49	337	71	21.1
	Home	50-53	276	58	21
	Religious	54-57	444	82	18.4
IV	Nature	62-63	116	16	13.7
	Home	64-65	174	14	8.1
	Religious	65-67	316	36	11.3
V	Nature	73-74	139	22	15.8
	Home	75-77	553	21	8.3
	Religious	78-82	401	48	11.9

It will be noticed that there are 48.6% of new words in the first nature study, 33.1% in the first home study, and only 23.5% of new words in the first religious study. The drill work in language is thus shifted, in large measure, from the Biblical story to the nature study and the domestic scene, where the meaning of the words can more readily be brought home to the children through action games, dramatic presentation, and their conduct in the home surroundings. This is made possible through the coördination of the nature study and the home study with the religious lesson in each story. These two preliminary parts thus constitute an efficient preparation for the religious study. The percentage of new words falls still lower in the subsequent chapters of the text-book; thus, in the second chapter it is only 19.4%; in the third chapter it is 18.4%; in the fourth chapter it is 11.3%; and in the fifth chapter 11.9%.

There are only 289 new words in the first chapter, which occupies 18 pages of the book. These words, which are given in an alphabetical list on pages 303-306 of the Teaching of Religion, should be practically learned by the children through

blackboard and chart exercises before they are given the book to read, or at least the first 142 words, which are employed in the first nature study and the first home scene, should be so mastered. The competent primary teacher will prepare most of the new words in this way before the child reaches them in the book.

The children need constant repetition of words in a context that is interesting to them. This, it will be seen, is amply provided for in this book. While there are 289 new words used in the first chapter, 345 words are repeated, and many of the 289 words are derivatives, such as plurals, past tenses, possessives, etc. The extent of this repetition in the subsequent chapters is still higher. Thus in chapter two there are 124 new words with 556 repetitions from this and the preceding chapter and in chapter three there are 211 new words with 846 repetitions. In chapter four there are 66 new words and 550 repetitions and in the final chapter there are 91 new words and 702 repetitions from this and the preceding chapters. It is evident, therefore, that the children are given abundant opportunity to master the vocabulary of 782 words contained in *Religion, First Book*.

The religious stories have been told in the simple language of childhood with as close an approximation as possible to the Biblical narrative. Perhaps no better way could be devised of bringing home to the primary teacher the value of a close correlation in the children's work. In the plan here outlined all the work in the schoolroom is made to serve as a preparation for the teaching of religion, while reading and the other legitimate studies of the curriculum are all strengthened by the work in religion. Let any one try to tell these Biblical stories to the children through the medium of a printed page without such preliminary studies and the value of this plan will at once be apparent. Again, the close correlation between the home and school secured through the domestic study in each chapter brings the home experience of the child to the teacher's aid in the work of the school, while the school work helps to build up correct habits in the home life of the child.

It will be seen that the chapters are not fragments collected

together in one book but are parts of one organic whole, for the work of each preceding chapter is a preparation for each subsequent chapter, both in vocabulary and in content. This allows the second nature study to be presented with only 23.5% new words. This connected narrative serves to maintain the child's interest and to lessen his difficulty in mastering the new words which are woven into the context. This in itself is a factor of no inconsiderable influence in the child's progress.

An examination of the vocabulary of this book will further show that the words therein contained are not only among the simplest words in the language but they are the most vivid in the child's possession and they are among the most serviceable words in all lines of thinking for the child and for the man. The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the content of the book deals with the deepest concerns of human life: with the child's relation to his parents, to his brothers and sisters, with man's duty to God and to his fellow man, with the ordinary human feelings and emotions. The language thus taught the child in his first year in school is not a mere instrument for his play but an instrument which he may turn to immediate use in all the deeper concerns of his life as well.

CATHOLIC EDUCATIONAL LITERATURE.

It has often been said by those in a position to know that no matter how thorough the normal training of a teacher may have been, three years of actual work in the schoolroom will find her settling into a rut unless she keeps her mind alive and her spirits refreshed by contact with the world outside the schoolroom. Furthermore, it is evident that she will rapidly become wooden in her methods and stereotyped in her knowledge unless she keeps abreast of her profession by frequent contact with current educational thought and literature. To avoid a deterioration of this sort every influence is brought to bear to induce the teachers to attend educational conventions and lectures, from time to time, on educational topics by

educators who are supposed to have something vital to impart. Many of our teachers, however, are so situated as to be unable to take advantage of these sources of help except at very rare intervals. The only hope of such teachers is the educational literature that may be placed within their reach.

The faculties of our parochial schools are very fortunately situated in many ways. They usually live under the same roof and frequent discussion with their fellow teachers is thus rendered possible. In many instances the teachers of several parochial schools live in one convent. This, of course, affords a still better opportunity for interchange of thought and experience. Again, our teachers are for the most part free from domestic care and from the thousand and one sources of distraction that daily fall to the lot of the public school teacher. This is either a blessing or a curse. A blessing if the opportunity is seized upon for improvement along academic and professional lines. But the converse if it merely means stagnation and loss of contact with the busy, active world for entrance into which they are preparing their pupils. Clearly, therefore, our teachers stand in greater need of the help that educational literature is calculated to afford than do any other teachers in the country. It is pertinent, therefore, to ask, how are the reading rooms of our teaching communities supplied? Shall we find on their reading table an abundance of recent literature on questions of vital interest to every teacher? Are the book-racks supplied with standard works on educational topics? Large sums of money have been spent in erecting school buildings and in equipping them with blackboards, charts, and such other devices as are demanded for the use of the children. But the teacher is the chief factor in the school and to neglect her and to ignore her needs is a very shortsighted policy.

The outlay required to supply educational literature to the teachers is not large, but the difficulty is in securing the literature. Emphasis is frequently laid on the fact that there is very little educational literature in English that is suitable for our teachers. The recent literature, particularly, is animated by a spirit that is far from encouraging to those who have the

interests of religion at heart. It is permeated, for the most part, by the spirit of agnosticism. God and religion are either entirely ignored or openly repudiated. Man's origin is traced from the brute, the existence of his spiritual soul is denied, his destiny confined to the brief years of his present life, the decrees of an Over-ruling Providence and the revealed truths that have built the present civilization and guided man upward from paganism and savagery are rejected. Such literature, it is argued, can scarcely prove helpful to the Catholic teacher who finds in all this a repudiation of the motives which have led her to embrace the religious life and to devote herself with tireless zeal to the upbuilding of Christian character in her pupils. Such literature may prove useful when it is a question of estimating the motives and measuring the influence of educational methods that spring from these sources, but evidently this literature cannot form the staple of the religious teacher's reading if she is to persevere in her life-work.

If Catholic educational literature is meagre at present, there is correspondingly little excuse for not having all there is of it within the reach of our teachers. The *Catholic Encyclopedia* is destined to serve many noble ends in the cause of truth and religion, but nowhere does it fill a greater need than in supplying authentic information to our Catholic teachers on a multitude of subjects upon which they should be well posted. It is to be hoped that this splendid work will be found in every convent home where our teachers assemble to refresh their spirits after the toil of the day and to store their minds with facts and principles that will render tomorrow's work in the Lord's vineyard more fruitful. But the *Encyclopedia*, however useful, is not sufficient. The teacher needs to come into contact with educational issues that have not been crystallized and taken out of the field of controversy as they must be before they are worthy to find a place in standard works of reference such as the *Encyclopedia*.

Attention has been called, from time to time, in the pages of the *Bulletin* to works on Catholic education which should find a place on the shelves of the pedagogical library of every Catholic school, such as, the Proceedings of the Catholic Edu-

cational Association, now in its sixth volume, the works of Bishop Spalding, Cardinal Gibbons, Brother Azarias, the Catholic School System of the United States by Dr. Burns, Jesuit Education by Rev. Robert Schwickerath, S. J., The Young Christian Teacher Encouraged by Brother Constantius, F.S.C., and the numerous works on catechetics that have recently issued from the press. We have added our mite to the meagre store in The Education of Our Girls, The Making and the Unmaking of a Dullard, The Psychology of Education and the Teaching of Religion. But works of this kind are not sufficient. Probably the greatest need of the teacher is periodical literature that offers her current topics, treated in brief form, by those who are competent to deal with the questions under discussion from a Catholic standpoint. And in this department our poverty has indeed been great. Some years ago the gifted Dr. Judge of Chicago made a brave attempt to relieve the situation, but his Catholic pedagogical review died in a single year from want of support. The Catholic School Journal of Milwaukee has been in existence eight years and has done some service in this field, but it is felt by many that it does not represent the larger thought and spirit of Catholic education nor does it in paper, type and artistic make-up present an attractive appearance to the tired teacher. However, it is not well to be too critical in these matters until a fuller support is guaranteed to more worthy publications. For the last two years the *Catholic University Bulletin* has lent its pages, in large measure, to educational thought and literature in the hope that it might bring refreshment and strength to the multitude of our teachers throughout the land who stand in such sore need of help along these lines. We are convinced that when those who are responsible for our school libraries come to realize the value of the *Bulletin* to our teachers, they will do their part in making it reach a still larger number of them in the future.

Since the last issue of the *Bulletin* a new Catholic educational periodical has made its appearance. We hope it will meet a hearty welcome in every Catholic school in the land. *Catholic School Work*, "a journal for the practical use of teachers published bi-monthly by the Educational Press, 123

East 23d St., New York," (\$1. per year) presents an attractive appearance. It is of convenient size, the paper and printing are good, and the list of contributors gives fair promise of splendid service in the years to come. The current number contains the following contributions: The Catholic Ideal in Education, Rt. Rev. Patrick J. Hayes, D. D., Chancellor of the Archdiocese of New York; The Work of the New York Catholic Schools, Rev. Thomas A. Thornton, Superintendent of the New York Catholic Schools; The Teaching of Religion, Rev. Joseph F. Smith, Superintendent of the New York Catholic Schools; Proposed New Course in Religion for all Grades with Plans of Study Prepared for the New York Catholic School Board, Rev. Joseph F. Smith; Proposed New Course and Syllabus in Drawing for all Grades Prepared by the New York Catholic School Board; Model Lesson, Nature Work, (The humming bird) Second Year, Anna Pergolie; Model Lesson, English, Sixth Year, (The Teaching of the Complex Sentence and the Relative Pronoun) Augusta M. Wilson, Ph. D.; Model Lesson, Geography, Seventh Year, (Longitude and Time) Gertrude M. Clark, M. A.; Model Lesson, Arithmetic, Eighth Year, (Percentage and its Applications) John J. Burke, M. A.; A Plea for Manual Training, Rev. Brother Victor, F. C. S., Assistant Visitor of the Brothers of the Christian Schools. It adds: Educational Notes and Comments, Book Department, Reviews, Inquiries, Announcement of Recent Books of Interest to Teachers.

The eminently practical character of this new periodical is conspicuous and yet it finds room for considerations of great moment both in the history of education and in its theory. We trust that every reader of the *Bulletin* in any way interested in Catholic education will subscribe for this magazine. They will be more than compensated for their small investment and they will help to support an enterprise which is destined to yield great fruit in the cause of God and country.

FALSE PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCATION.

Monsignor Hayes, in the leading article of *Catholic School Work*, gives terse expression to many weighty truths which should be constantly kept before the eyes of our teachers that they may not be misled by the false philosophy of education that pervades the school atmosphere of our day. "School systems charged with the training of the young approach the ideal in so far as they employ the means practical and potent enough to develop the mind and soul of the child in the manner the Creator intended. The Catholic Church protests against educational methods that do not begin and end with God, because it is in Him we live, move, and have our being; and since this is so, the training of the child must be towards God and not away from Him or against Him." If this truth were understood as fully as it should be by our teachers and lived up to as uncompromisingly as we have a right to expect from those chosen sons and daughters of the Church to whom the formation of the characters and the development of the minds of our children are entrusted, we would not so often find the anomaly of a school calling itself Catholic, taught by religious, and still employing text-books and methods that are in direct contravention of the truth so well stated by Dr. Hayes. A Catholic school is not one in which secular knowledge is imparted separately without reference to religion or to God and religious instruction added during one or two intervals of the day. Such a school is essentially pagan or secular no matter by whom it is taught, even if it be such a broad-minded pagan school as to permit religion to visit its halls at stated intervals. Religious education means that religion must permeate the whole atmosphere of the school and give life and meaning to every truth imparted within its walls. "There is a teacher with divine authority, the Church, not only favoring the development of intellect, but, at the same time, unfolding to the soul a realm of knowledge into which man, by reason alone, can peer but dimly, and for which he needs a divine illumination from God Himself. The experience of the ages shows

that religion ever has interpreted nature and man's existence in the world, and while so doing, has given to literature, science and art the greatest possible inspiration. Wherever Christianity was preached and established, civilization of a high order came into being; and the sublimest ideals of human life were set up to teach man the way to walk in this world that the end of his mortal journey might be realized in an eternity of blessed immortality and happiness with God."

On the other hand, wherever religion disappears from among the formative influences of a people extinction is the ultimate result. This truth stands out in bold relief in the history of the decline of ancient civilizations and among Christian nations it is equally obvious, as may be seen from a study of the French Revolution and as is becoming painfully evident in the result of purely secular education in our own land. There is a large and influential body of citizens outside the pale of the Catholic Church who will heartily endorse this statement of the fundamental principle underlying this phase of education as stated by Monsignor Hayes. "Religion belongs to the primary agencies which have been at work within the soul of man from the dawn of creation. The principle of ignoring religion in education is a fundamental fallacy; the practice of restricting the province of education to informing the intellect propagates a grave error full of menace to American life. Together with the enlightenment of the intellect should go a strengthening of the will and an awakening of conscience; and this with the definite aim of elevating the whole being of man, his moral as well as his intellectual side. Education must be, indeed, something more and better than the study of merely secular branches of learning."

This ideal was cast into practical form by Father Smith in his article on the Teaching of Religion and in the course in Religion which he proposes for all the grades. We quote the opening statement of his article. "The Catholic teacher in the parochial school must ever keep before his mind that the teaching of religion is the compelling and paramount reason for the existence of our costly, magnificent separate system of education. This fact alone will make him realize the im-

portance of religious education and will impress upon him the necessity of giving it the place of honor in the school curriculum. This primacy of the training in religion arises from the fundamental fact that man is composed of body and soul and that not only the mind but the heart, the conscience and the will—the entire man—must be educated. The existence of a Supreme Being that created the world and guides and rules the universe and all human beings, is made known to us not only through the inspired books of revelation, but also through the book of nature and the consciousness of every intelligent creature. Any system of education that attempts to ignore this fact, and fails to teach man his relations to his Creator is not only incomplete but false and misleading.”

We would emphasize particularly the remark that the existence of a Supreme Being is “made known to us not only through the inspired books of revelation but through the *book of nature and the consciousness of every intelligent creature.*” From this it is perfectly plain that we are not fulfilling our duty as Christian teachers if we segregate the teaching of religion from the other subjects of the curriculum. We have attempted to show how religious truth should be organized with secular knowledge in the first two primary grades. Religion, First Book, and Religion, Second Book, are concrete embodiments of this principle and all that has thus far been said in these articles on the teaching of religion is in direct line with this. This thought is further emphasized by Father Smith (page 11). “From the history, therefore, of every early school, and particularly of the Catholic school of Colonial times in our own land, the teacher will learn that the Church has always rejected the idea of character which is based upon the natural virtues alone, but that ‘it is Christian character, based upon the supernatural virtues and teaching of Christ not distinct from the natural virtues, but including them, and much more besides, which the Christian school places first among its duties, as the thing of most fundamental importance to the child’ (Burns). He will be filled with a desire to adopt the Church’s system of education when he discovers from the above arguments of the learned psychologist, Rev. Dr. Pace, which

we have all too briefly quoted in almost his exact words, that in following her Divine Model-Teacher, Christ, she has during all the centuries followed the laws of the mind and anticipated the findings and methods of so-called modern education. Have we hitherto followed, are we now making the most of the methods pursued by the Church? Is our religious education all that it should be? Has the teaching of religion kept pace with the improvements in the methods of imparting the secular branches? Are we fully alive to the educational value, even from an intellectual standpoint, of Christian Doctrine? These are a few of the frank and friendly criticisms that have been passed on the teaching of religion in the Catholic schools of this and other lands.

“The newest and best way of giving religious education, one now much in vogue, and one which is being strongly advocated in Catholic books, commentaries and magazines, is called the psychological method. As its name implies, it is a method of imparting religious knowledge according to the laws of the mind, of applying to this all-important study the well-established findings of Catholic psychology. It means to follow the way of teaching of the All-Knowing Master-Mind, it means to follow the example of the Church, in her teaching, her liturgy, and her symbolism.” Our Catholic teachers will be particularly interested in the “plan of study for catechism” and the “plan of study for Bible history” as well as in the “proposed new course in religion.” This course marks a step in advance over that now in use in some of our schools, and whether this course be adopted outside of New York in its entirety or not, its careful perusal cannot fail to help the teacher of Christian Doctrine.

LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION.

The present trend of education everywhere might be justly characterized as a transition from the static to the dynamic. The scholar of to-day feels that he cannot know anything as it is until he has learned something of how it has come to be what it is. This is preëminently true of all educational prob-

lems. It is only the superficial mind that will rest content with appearances and seek to fathom the meaning of movements and tendencies without having consulted the historical development that lies back of all such movements. Father Thornton, in this first number of *Catholic School Work*, gathers into a few brief pages some of the salient points in an intensely interesting and important chapter of the history of Catholic education in this country. The younger generation of our teachers is apt to forget the origin of the public school system in this country. Here is its origin in New York as described by Father Thornton: "The Catholic agitation of that time was directed against the conduct of the trustees of the Public School Society, then in charge of the city's public schools and the medium through which the city's money was dispensed for the support of its schools. In 1840 the public schools of the city contained 12,189 pupils, for whose education, in that same year, \$115,799.42 were expended. This society was organized in 1805 by a number of public-spirited men headed by Honorable De Witt Clinton. Its original purpose as set forth in its charter was to provide a free school for the education of poor children in the city, 'who do not belong to, or are not provided for by any religious society.' In 1808 its name was changed to the 'Free School Society of New York,' and again in 1826 to the 'Public School Society of New York,' and its powers widened 'to provide for the education of all children not otherwise provided for.' Year by year, thereafter, this society got further away from its original Christian purpose, until in 1840 it had become a huge sectarian combination against the Catholic school, the only one of the denominational schools which continued to oppose its monopoly of the education of the children of New York City. In spite of all protest and petition, the Catholics were denied their just and much-needed share of the school appropriations. But some good and lasting results were obtained. The Public School Society was reorganized on a more American plan from which has resulted the present gigantic New York Public School, and the textbooks used in these schools were purged of their calumnious stories against the Catholic Church. Convinced that no aid

was to be expected from the State, the Catholics of New York resolved to continue to organize and maintain their own system of free schools, at their own expense. 'Go,' said Archbishop Hughes, 'build your own schools; raise arguments in stone with a cross on top; raise arguments in the shape of the best educated and most moral citizens of the republic, and the day will come when you will enforce recognition.' "

How nobly our people throughout the whole country have responded to this call is evidenced by our present Catholic school system, not only in the Archdiocese of New York, but throughout the whole United States. Never in the whole history of Christianity has there been a more generous sacrifice on the part of Christian people for a principle. After paying their share of the taxes to support a public school system in which the children of their neighbors were being educated, they freely taxed themselves to build and maintain a separate Catholic school system. The amount of money here involved has usually been set down at altogether too low a figure, and yet it is impressive enough; but this money is the least part of the sacrifice involved. The tens of thousands of young men and young women who have renounced the world with all its allurements and ambitions to devote themselves to a life of poverty and unremitting toil in the cause of Catholic education is a far more impressive argument than any hordes of gold that might be offered even by the poor toilers of the land. But the financial side of this argument is well worth considering. Father Thornton gives some very impressive figures, and they are evidently not the result of guess-work. "In the Borough of Manhattan to-day, which in 1840 comprised the entire city, instead of eight schools with 4,000 pupils, there are sixty-two schools with a register of 50,613 pupils. In 1840 nearly all the Catholic schools were held in the poorly lighted basements of the churches. Now they are accommodated in elaborate fire-proof buildings which have been erected by the zealous pastors of New York on the dearest land in the world, through the generosity of their people, at a cost of \$8,495,458, and which are maintained on a high plane of pedagogical excellence at an ever-increasing annual expenditure of hundreds of thous-

ands of dollars. The cost of maintenance for the year 1908 was \$553,924. Within the entire limits of the Archdiocese there are 139 schools with a total register of 70,002 pupils. The school buildings with the land they stand on are worth \$11,016,858 and during the year 1908 the sum of \$774,420 was spent in their maintenance. These one hundred and thirty-nine Catholic schools may not be classed as private schools supported by the tuition fees paid regularly by the parents who send their children to them for their education. On the contrary, these are public schools open to all the Catholic school children of the parishes. Every requisite for their education is supplied to the pupils free of charge, so that no charges for tuition or text-books are exacted from the children or their parents. The millions of dollars required for the purchase of the ground and the erection of the school buildings, as well as the hundreds of thousands of dollars spent yearly to keep them open for the children, have been and are provided for out of the regular revenues of the churches which maintain the schools; which revenues are the voluntary contributions of all the people of the parishes for the works of the Church."

There is a side to this financial sacrifice, however, that has not often been adverted to by writers on the subject. There is no question but that this sacrifice was willingly made by people who could ill afford it without any thought of earthly compensation. It was made by loyal Catholic hearts in response to the call of the Church rendered articulate on the lips of the illustrious Archbishop Hughes. But like so many other generous deeds, it has been bread cast upon the waters. The Catholics of New York have prospered. They have not suffered in their temporal affairs by the sacrifices which they made in the interests of Catholic education. Their children are multiplied in the land. They are filling positions of trust and influence. To them is committed in large and ever increasing measure the destinies of the commonwealth. This were compensation enough to make every Catholic realize that what they give to God is given back to them an hundred-fold.

There are many Catholics to-day who are confidently looking forward to the obtaining of support for our schools from the

public treasury. The justice of their claim is so apparent that fair-minded men of every shade of belief are forced to recognize it. And yet, before pushing forward this policy, it would be well that we make a careful study of the history of education where it is under State control, and it would be well also to devote a little attention to the figures involved. It has been noticed in many cities that public school buildings cost the city from two to three times as much as equally well built schools cost our Catholic parishes. This comes from the munificence of our public enterprises, from politics and graft, if you will, and on the other hand, from the conscientious care and self-sacrificing devotion of those to whom the erection of Catholic school buildings is usually entrusted. To this consideration we should add another. According to Father Thornton, "The Board of Education of New York City spends about \$50. a year for the education of each pupil in the New York Public Schools." The cost per capita of the pupils in our Catholic schools may easily be ascertained from the figures given above. 70,002 pupils attending the Catholic schools in the Archdiocese of New York for the year 1908 cost \$774,420, or \$11.06 per capita. If our Catholic children were being educated in the public schools of New York the additional demand made upon the Catholic tax payers would probably exceed by a considerable figure the sum which they now contribute to the support of separate Catholic schools, so that what in reality was intended as a free offering to God and the zeal of our Catholic teachers and pastors have turned into a saving. The handing over of our Catholic schools, therefore, to government control would mean not only an added tax upon our non-Catholic citizens, but a greater outlay of money on the part of our Catholics.

STATE INTERFERENCE IN CATHOLIC SCHOOLS.

Every approach towards State control should be jealously looked into. The history of government interference in the past in all Christian countries shows the danger which is to be found in the situation. Of course the State has its rights in

the premises which no intelligent citizen will ignore. She has a right to see to it that the children are properly educated in all those things which lead to good citizenship, but her rights end here. The education of the child is essentially a parental function; as much so as the care and protection of his physical being. The parent is the natural provider of the mental food of the child as well as of the physical food. The school's function is, therefore, essentially a delegated parental function. But just as the parent must submit to the legitimate authority of the State in the discharge of his civic duties and to the jurisdiction of the Church in all spiritual matters, so must the school in like manner, while fulfilling essentially a parental function, submit to the legitimate jurisdiction of both the Church and the State. Experience, however, shows us that the State is seldom content with this, and only in extremely rare cases has it been content with it where it acted as the trustee of the people in supplying the funds to support the school.

In the matter of the Regents' examinations in the State of New York we have an illustration of this State aggressiveness. For some time the pupils of the New York Catholic schools have been taking the Regents' examinations. "In the year 1908," says Father Thornton, "4,998 pupils from the Catholic schools of New York, took 15,006 examinations in the elementary and first year high school subjects, which the Regents found perfect enough, according to their standards, to accept for their counts and pass cards." This is all very well and may serve to show to those amongst us who are benighted enough to need such demonstration that our Catholic schools are equal in efficiency to the public schools. If they were not more than this it would be an eternal disgrace, for our teaching staff is recruited for the most part from religious who devote their whole lives, from motives of religious zeal, to the work of education, whereas teaching in the public schools is for the most part purely an economic function and the teaching staff is in large measure made up of non-professional teachers. But this is a digression. It is a very dangerous thing to invite State interference in our Catholic schools. Such interference is a far graver injustice and is fraught with infinitely graver dangers

than is the present situation of the unjust apportionment of the school fund, of which complaint is so often made. However harmless the Regents' examinations may seem at first sight it is but an entering wedge to still further interference. Where the school has to look forward to the time when the children must pass the Regents' examination, no one can reasonably doubt that the whole trend of the school will be modified accordingly both in curriculum and in methods, and the modification in this instance is in the direction of the de-Christianized school. Moreover, Mr. Draper, President of the Board of Regents, has shown where such interference naturally leads to by publishing a regulation, during the past year, by which the children of all schools not organized under the Board of Regents will have to make seventy-five points in order to pass, whereas all public school pupils and all pupils from Catholic schools organized under the Board of Regents need only sixty points to pass. This is exercising a very decided pressure to compel our schools to organize under the Regents and by so doing to give the State more direct control over the organization and spirit of the school. The folly of educating our people, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, to the spectacle of State interference in the standardizing and methods of our Catholic schools must be apparent to all students of the subject.

Rt. Rev. Mgr. Hallinan, D.D., V.G., in an able article in the *Irish Educational Review*, April, 1909, entitled "State Aggressiveness in Education," says: "Education, in the true sense of the word, is not a mere accumulation of knowledge, but the process of development of the whole man, the intellectual and moral culture which springs from the fashioning of the mind and heart. The right to educate belongs primarily to the parents. It is a domestic, not a civil function. It is an inalienable right, involving a duty. The Church has its rights in education. These are either denied or ignored by outsiders, but must be acknowledged by all Catholics. These rights are, moreover, of divine origin, inherent in its office and constitution. She exercises them directly over the child, who has been incorporated into her by baptism, and for whose moral and spiritual welfare she thus becomes responsible. As this de-

pend, to a great extent, on the kind of education the child gets, so the Church has an inherent right to such supervision and control over its education as will give her a reasonable security that in no department of education will these interests be imperilled. She exercises this right also, but indirectly, through the parents of the child who are bound in the discharge of this most important natural duty towards their child, the same as in that of every other moral obligation, to follow the directions of the Church—their infallible guide. This right the Church has always claimed and exercised. From the cradle of Christianity up to the revolt of the 16th century the work of education was carried out principally, if not exclusively, under the immediate control and education of the Church. Since then, however, the secular power has been gradually encroaching on the domain of the Church—by either denying her rights or restricting them within the narrowest limits. Latterly, in many countries, the civil power has been legalizing a system of education which seeks to divorce religion altogether from it, and to bring it completely and exclusively under its own control.”

The writer then sets forth clearly and concisely the rights of the State in the province of education, after which he continues: “But the trend of modern States is, not to respect the rights of parents or religion, but to monopolize the whole work of education, and ignore or trample on their rights. This is effected either directly, by inhibiting all educational institutions except those under its own immediate control, or indirectly, by unequal treatment of different teaching institutions. Here in Ireland we have been for generations the victims of both kinds of monopoly. We see the sad consequences of it in almost every department of the civil life of the nation; and if, in the higher and spiritual sphere, it has not produced disastrous consequences, it is due to a special Providence of God.”

We are more fortunate in this respect than Ireland since our government does not and cannot constitutionally exercise the first species of control here alluded to, but it can and does exercise the second species, that of “unequal treatment of different teaching institutions.” It does this in New York State, with all the boasted liberality and fair-mindedness of

the Regents, when it demands seventy-five points in order to pass the Regents' examinations by children from Catholic schools that elect to retain their own distinct character unhampered by the control and interference of the State, while it allows children from State schools and those under State control to pass these examinations at sixty points.

In the last few years this country has witnessed the spectacle of the State and its universities attempting to monopolize the education of the whole country by its system of affiliations, entrance examinations, etc. Discussing this subject, Monsignor Hallinan says: "Of all monopolies, there is none so dangerous as that of education, and when used by a government regarding the nation, it is a most insidious and deadly attack on the natural liberty of the subject, and becomes one of the most hateful forms of persecution and tyranny." The Monsignor continues to point out that the mere fact of the State's contributing the funds does not justify it in assuming such monopoly, but wherever the State does contribute the funds, as a matter of fact it has the power in its hands to enforce this policy and it usually does so. We may plead against it as we will, but history reveals to us the extreme difficulty or the utter futility of such pleading. Here is Monsignor Hallinan's statement of the case: "Nor does the fact that the monies for the work of education are paid by the State give any title to such monopoly. For the State merely applies the monies, which are supplied by its subjects in taxes, and, consequently, the State is only a trustee or administrator of public funds and becomes guilty of injustice if it applies them for purposes opposed to the public good or in an unjust and partial manner." Nevertheless, as Monsignor Hallinan points out, the State has persistently dealt with the educational system in Ireland in this unjust manner, and the State is probably as fair-minded there as elsewhere.

Wisdom evidently bids us beware of State interference and State control. Even contributing the funds necessary to the support of our schools would be a very cheap exchange for our liberty apart from all other considerations, such as those which we have pointed out in this article. We have built our schools

without State aid and have supported them without State aid thus far and it is a very short-sighted policy to sacrifice our advantages now for a very questionable financial gain. All interference in our schools on the part of State institutions should be guarded against with the most watchful care. In Belgium, a Catholic country, and for the last twenty-five years under a Catholic ministry, the Church has refused to accept State aid for its schools and insisted on maintaining them from the voluntary contributions of her children. WHY? Because the French Revolution taught the Church in Belgium a lesson never to be forgotten. Those who are advocating State aid for our Catholic schools in this country would do well to study the history of Catholic education in Belgium and its relationship to State control and State support, before placing the Church and the school in a position from which retreat would be difficult or impossible.

The splendid series of articles contributed by Monsignor Hallinan to the *Irish Educational Review* on State Aggressiveness in Education, should be carefully studied by all those who are responsible for shaping the policies of our Catholic schools in this country. We have quoted from the Monsignor at some length, but the articles should be read in their entirety to be fully appreciated, and it may not be amiss right here to recommend to our Catholic schools the *Irish Educational Review*, which has done good work in the two years of its existence. Many of its articles, naturally, deal with local situations, but even these have their value in this country and there is always something of a high, scholarly, and Catholic character the perusal of which would benefit every teacher in our Catholic schools.

The burden of the article from which we have been quoting concerns another phase of State aggressiveness which is peculiarly opportune in this country at the present time and serves to strengthen the suggestion just given that educational problems in Ireland are not so different from educational problems in this country and that we can ill afford to lose sight of the solution of these problems that is being worked out by the scholarly hierarchy and clergy of Ireland.

Our State institutions, of course, admit of no religious test and within the last few years the Carnegie Institute has adopted the same motto and the country has witnessed the most disgraceful betrayal of religious interests since the days of Judas Iscariot in the clamorous hurry of so many educational institutions in this country, built and endowed by religious bodies, to renounce all religious tests so that their retiring professors might enjoy the pension offered by this Institute. The thirty million dollars of the Carnegie Fund calls to mind persistently those other thirty pieces of silver that were too unclean for the coffers of the temple and were used to buy a burying place for paupers. We have frequently alluded to this subject in the pages of the *Bulletin*, listen to what Monsignor Hallinan has to say on the subject. "Let us now examine another form of State aggressiveness, which is being forced to the front with persistent pertinacity, under the guise of liberty. I allude to the motto: 'No religious tests.' Let us examine this shibboleth from a Catholic point of view and in the light of Catholic principles. Doubtless, in most respects, sincerely religious-minded members of other religious denominations repudiate and reject it on the same grounds and for the same reasons. And, first of all, we must distinguish between the words 'no religious tests' when applied to students and when applied to teachers. As has been already remarked, in an united system of education, that is, one in which all the teachers or professors are Catholics, there is no difficulty in allowing non-Catholics as well as Catholics to attend such lectures. The harm comes in when the principle applies to the teacher or professors, that is, when appointments are to be made in the teaching profession, any person, who may be otherwise qualified for the position, has a perfect right to it, no matter what that person's religious belief may be. Hence, a Jew, or Unitarian, or Socinian, has as good a right, on principle, to be appointed a professor or teacher in an educational institution founded with such a charter as a Christian or a Catholic, and that in a Christian land. Looking at such a principle in itself and theoretically, the first thing that strikes one is, that it sets aside altogether the rights of the parents to educate their children, and substitutes for them the civil power

or government of the day. Hitherto the teachers have been regarded as the representatives of the parents, and, as such, were entitled to the respect and obedience of the pupils. The teachers, on the other hand, representing the parents, were expected to give such a religious, moral and secular training as their parents would, had they been able and willing to do so. It is only in this sense, and to this extent, that the secular power has the right to raise money for educational purposes. Now, however, according to the 'no religious tests' principle, the State, outstepping its proper function says: I will not give any of the public money which I have received from the tax payers for educational purposes, unless every person, no matter what his religious belief, be he Jew, Turk, heathen, or heretic, be equally eligible to teach a Catholic child as a Catholic. This means that education is to be administered as a political department, without any regard to the wishes or the conscience of the parents. It is, therefore, an invasion of the natural right of the parent, a subversion of order, an unjust application of public money, and an odious and indefensible system of persecution and tyranny."

But what are we to think of the situation in this country, where the denominational schools and colleges have flocked to the standard of Andrew Carnegie and allowed him the control which is here denied to the State? We cannot forbear making a further lengthy quotation from the article before us. "Furthermore, such an enactment rests on another false principle, namely, that education may be safely divorced from religion, and that religious influences may be excluded from the schools. . . . Before the revolt of the sixteenth century, the idea of education without religion was so grotesque and absurd that it entered not into the minds of the people. . . . What a change has come over the face of Christendom since the principles of Protestantism took root and propagated their natural and pernicious fruits. Ever since, the tendency is to sacrifice religion to the supposed interests of education. As dogma after dogma was set aside and the march of heresy toward infidelity became more marked, the downward process was reflected in the school, and, through the school, in every department of the life

of the people. In some countries, at the present moment, education is degraded to the position of being the handmaid of infidelity, and where it has not reached that pass, the tendency is generally in that direction. Nor is this infidelity begotten of Godless education a mere speculation. It is a living, concrete fact, having a policy of its own well suited to attain the specific end, at which it aims, and that is the complete destruction of Christian civilization and a substitution in its stead of a new society and order of things, without authority, without property, without Christianity, or without God Himself. It is a return to paganism. . . . True, the object in view is never plainly stated. Neither are all those who are instruments of this unholy work conscious of the use that is being made of them, and the ultimate effects of the principles and systems which they are laying down with such plausible reasoning. To say as they do say—that they have nothing to do with the teaching of religion, that they will neither praise nor blame the religion of any student in the academic hall, that they neither teach religion nor assail it, all this sounds fair and looks attractive to the unreflecting. But, while professing all this, they are contradicting themselves and acting in opposition to their fundamental principles. For the system itself is a denial of a Catholic truth, a violation of a Catholic principle, which every Catholic is bound to believe and hold, namely, that education must not be divorced from religion, but should be united with it. Regarding, then, this motto, ‘no religious tests for teachers,’ from whatever point of view one considers it, it necessarily leads to disastrous results wherever it is applied.”

We have pointed out in preceding numbers of the *Bulletin* some of the pernicious fruits that schools of this character are producing in this land and we shall have more to say on the same subject in the subsequent issues of this magazine.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

De Necessitate Credendi et Credendorum seu de Fide salutari, dissertatio theologica, quam pro gradu Lectoris Sacrae Theologiae, in Ordine Praedicatorum consequendo, scripsit Fr. Raimundus-Maria Martin, eiusdem Ordinis alumnus. Lovanii Ap. A. Uystpruyst-Dieudonné via dicta de la Monnaie, 1909.

In this dissertation dedicated to Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Mechlin, and bearing his imprimatur, Father Martin undertakes to establish the two following propositions: 1—"Credere aliquid fide theologica supernaturali necessarium est necessitate medii ad salutem."

2—"Necessitate medii ad salutem duo mysteria Incarnationis et Ss. Trinitatis in V. Test. credere tenebantur maiores explicite, minores implicite tantum; in Novo Testamento vero, necessitate medii ad salutem haec mysteria credere tenentur omnes explicite."

The second proposition is taken almost verbatim from St. Thomas (III Dist. XXV, qu. II, art. 2 sol. 2,—2a 2ae, qu. II, a 7. et alibi). Even those who are not willing to accept the author's conclusions must admit that the dissertation furnishes a very clear explanation and a very strong defense of his thesis. As to the objection frequently made, viz., that those who maintain the second proposition as well as the first make salvation too difficult under the New Law, I would answer with the author: In exceptional cases there must be a special intervention of Providence, in order that the one to be saved may have supernatural faith (in Deum auctorem supernaturalem) and it is just as easy for God to make known three truths (God, the Trinity, the Incarnation) as it is to make known one. The well-known text from St. Thomas (De Veritate, qu. XIV, a. 11, ad 1) covers all cases: "Si aliquis in silvis enutritus, ductum naturalis rationis sequeretur in appetitu boni et fuga mali, certissime est tenendum, quod ei Deus vel per internam inspirationem revelaret ea quae sunt ad credendum necessaria, vel aliquem fidei praedicatorem ad eum dirigeret, sicut misit Petrum ad Cornelium (Art. 10); hoc enim ad divinam providentiam pertinet, ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis ad salutem, dummodo ex parte eius non impediatur." To this Father Martin adds a

reference to the *Revue Thomiste*, September-October, 1905, p. 385 and sqq., "ubi doctrina tradita exemplo illustratur; quod exemplum desumptum est ex opere; *Trinidad*, Journal d'un missionnaire dominicain, pp. 273-276, Paris, Retaux."

Perfect order and clearness characterize the dissertation: the "Elenchus auctorum et operum consulendorum" is very valuable.

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century.

By Joseph Louis Perrier, Ph. D. New York, Columbia University Press and The Macmillan Company, 1909. Pp. viii, 344.

Strange as it may seem, the greatest difficulty in the way of the revival of Scholasticism has been the unwillingness of the general philosophical public to give the Neo-Scholastic credit for singleness of purpose. Picavet in France and Paulsen in Germany have openly expressed their conviction that the impulse given to Neo-Thomism by Leo XIII was primarily and essentially a political affair. The command to return to the genuine works of the great Scholastics simply masked an attempt to subvert the Third Republic or to strengthen the position of the Centre Party in the Reichstag. It is one of the many merits of Dr. Perrier's book that it dispels this ridiculous illusion and shows very clearly that Neo-Scholasticism has no such *arrière-pensée*. Neo-Scholasticism claims to be a philosophy, and invites an examination of its claims. It is neither a political plot nor an incident in religious propagandism. It has a right to be judged in the same way as Hegelianism, Agnosticism or Pragmatism is judged.

Dr. Perrier's book is chiefly historical. It gives a very accurate and detailed account of the persons, institutions, events and literary productions which brought about the movement of Catholic thought known as Neo-Scholasticism. The account of the revival in the United States and Canada will, naturally, be read with the greatest interest. The account too, is intelligently sympathetic, as is evident from the protest which is entered (p. 169) against the sweeping condemnation of the Roman Thomists by M. Besse. But more remarkable than the historical sketch is the singularly clear and generally accurate exposition of the Scholastic system in Logic, Metaphysics, Cosmology, Psychology, Natural Theology and Ethics.

The author's mental attitude is indicated in several passages besides the following: "It has become a fashion in philosophy to deride the notions of the plain man. . . . He is ridiculed as a fetish worshipper if he feels the slightest sympathy for the old doctrine of causal power. For my part, I confess that I can hardly part from these naïve beliefs; and, at the risk of being mocked for not having yet bestriden the threshold of philosophy, I frankly take part with the plain man in his realism, his libertarianism, his belief in efficiency" (p. 69).

Not by any means the least valuable part of the book is the "Bibliography," extending over almost a hundred pages. This alone would entitle the author to the gratitude of all who favor the Neo-Scholastic revival. We have no doubt that his book will be read by many non-Catholics who are curious to know what Scholasticism is and by a still larger number of those among us who wish to know the history of philosophy within the Church during the last thirty years.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Le Catéchisme Romain, ou l'enseignement de la Doctrine Chrétienne. Explication nouvelle, par Georges Bareille, Docteur en Théologie et en Droit canonique, Chanoine honoraire de Toulouse. Tomes I-II: Première partie, Le Symbole, Monstrejeau, 1906, J. M. Soubiron.

This is a timely and practical publication, called forth by the Encyclical of Pius X, *Acerbo Nimis* (April 15, 1905), on "The Teaching of Christian Doctrine." The obligation of instructing the people in the truths and precepts of our faith has been urged upon all those who have the care of souls from the days of the Apostles, who received from our Lord Himself the commission to "teach all nations," down to this twentieth century when Providence gave to the Universal Church a supreme Pastor whose desire is "to re-establish all things in Christ" (Eph. 1, 10).

Pius X ordained that "all parish priests and others having the care of souls, shall, in addition to the usual homily on the Gospel to be delivered at the Parochial Mass on all days of obligation, explain the Catechism for the faithful, in an easy style. . . . In this instruction they are to make use of the Catechism of the Council of Trent; and they are to divide the matter in such a way as within the space of four or five years to treat of the apostles'

Creed, the Sacraments, the Decalogue, the Lord's Prayer, and the Precepts of the Church."

Canon Bareille's volumes are intended, principally, to be an aid to those whose duty it will be to instruct the faithful in accordance with the directions of Pius X.

The author of the "*Explication Nouvelle*" religiously preserves the "*Catechismus ad Parochos*," adding notes, explanations and short treatises, historical, scientific, dogmatical, moral, and liturgical, which will be a mine of information, easy of access, and most helpful to those who wish to add life and variety to their explanations of the Creed, the Sacraments, the Decalogue and the Lord's Prayer.

The first two volumes are devoted to annotations on the Creed. Every chapter is strictly "up-to-date," including refutations of the pernicious Loisy theories. M. Bareille is modern, but not a Modernist. The articles on the Teaching of the Catechism before and after the Council of Trent, on the *Creed* and *Creeds*, on *Faith*, and on *Dogma* deserve special mention. The bibliography, giving a valuable list of authors to be consulted, is a feature that will be highly appreciated. The author protests that it is not his intention to compose a Theology, although the work, when completed, will be an excellent manual of theology for pastors: and he promises to give an enlarged "*Praxis Catechismi Romani*," which will be welcomed by many busy priests as a hand-book of solid, authoritative instructions for Sundays and feast-days, far and away more reliable than the ordinary collections of *prones* and instructions.

The great authority of the original text, together with the learning and skill of the annotator, make it very desirable that this valuable work should be finished in the near future, and presented as soon as possible, in an English dress to the priests of the United States.

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

A Manual of Moral Theology for English-Speaking Countries.

By Rev. Thomas Slater, S. J., St. Bruno's College, St. Asaph.
With notes on American legislation, by Rev. Michael Martin,
S. J., Professor of Moral Theology, St. Louis University. Vols.
I-II. Benziger, New York, 1908.

The object of these volumes is "to present the common teaching of the Catholic moral theologians in an English dress."

As to the advisability of such a publication the author writes: "That such a book will be found useful seems certain from the fact that works of the kind exist in abundance in other modern languages."

Priests, indeed, should learn theology from works written in Latin, and the author is to be commended for not translating into English those chapters or treatises, the knowledge of which is not necessary for those who are not called to guide sinners in all things that pertain to life as it is in this miserable world. It is, however, certain that the knowledge of moral theology in its general outlines and in many special tracts will be very useful and in nowise hurtful to many laymen, *e. g.*, to physicians, lawyers, professors in colleges and others, who either cannot or will not take the pains to read theological works written in Latin. Moreover, the author's hopes of doing good even among non-Catholics are well founded. It is well to prove to those who frequently misrepresent and malign the moral theology of the Catholic Church that we conceal nothing, bearing in mind, however, that it is not desirable to be too plain and explicit in treating subjects which should not so much as be mentioned among good Christians whenever silence is possible.

Father Slater's volumes follow the order and contain all the treatises usually given in good manuals of Catholic moral theology, the work being done with remarkable care and accuracy.

The author has succeeded admirably in the translation of terms and definitions which many could give in Latin, but would not attempt to express in English. And this striking feature of the work will make it acceptable even to priests and students who are familiar with the official language of the Church.

Father Martin's notes on American Legislation are a very valuable addition to the work, and they will be gratefully received by the zealous, hard-working priests of the United States.

Where everything is well done it is not necessary to call attention to special chapters. It is to be hoped that all non-Catholics—if such there be—who still "have their suspicions" about the Jesuits will read and meditate upon the chapters on "The End of Human Acts" and on "Lying," in order to satisfy themselves once and forever that no Jesuit ever held that "the end justifies the means," and that their theories concerning mental reservations furnish no excuse for doubting their statements.

The chapters on matrimonial legislation and on the organization

of the Roman Curia are up to the date of the latest decrees of Rome.

I have no intention of exciting, much less of entering into, a controversy concerning the relative merits of Probabilism and Equiprobabilism; the discussion would probably do more harm than good. Nevertheless I cannot refrain from making the following remarks anent Father Slater's chapter on the "The Probable Conscience."

1st. The example used on pp. 68, 69 and 73, it seems to me, is not well chosen and will "cloud the issue" because it might well be claimed that when a young man reasons as follows: This action which I am contemplating is lawful, "*for example marrying according to my promise a good and suitable person in spite of the prohibition of my parents, which indeed does not seem to be reasonable,*" he is reasoning according to an opinion which should be called *more probable* than the opposite, if indeed it be not morally certain.

2nd. Whatever may be said of Probabilism in se, or of St. Alphonsus' opinions during his earlier years, to me it seems certain that for about twenty years before his death he defended Equiprobabilism, which he calls *his* system. Why *his* if he did not reject Probabilism? In a letter dated July 30th, 1768—the document cited by Father Slater is of 1755—St. Alphonsus wrote: "My system on Probability is not that of the Jesuit Fathers, for I do not admit (*io reprovo*) that one can follow an opinion which he knows to be less probable, as Busembaum and Lacroix teach." (See Lettera ccix in *Lettere di Alfonso Maria de Ligouri, parte secunda, Correspondenza speciale*, 1890). And this opinion was formed after thirty years of study and prayer. "Triginta circiter annis de hac materia innumeros legi auctores tam benignos quam rigidos, et infra hoc tempus a Deo lumen indesinenter quaesivi ad statuendum systema quod tenere debeam, ne errem: tandem systema meum statui." (Dichiaraz. del systema, n. 49). In the *Homo Apostolicus*, I, 75, we read "*Quod meum systema aequiprobabilis opinionis evidenter demonstrasse mihi suadeo.*" And again "*Si opinio quae stat pro lege videatur certe probabilior, ipsam omnino sectari tenemur.*" (*Theol. Moral., Morale Systema*, n. 56). There is no necessity of multiplying these citations. The words of St. Alphonsus himself confirm the contention of his disciples that the Saint defended Equiprobabilism. If at any time he admitted Probabilism, he

repudiated that system towards the end of his life. Any person desiring more information on this subject can find it in works on moral theology, written by the Redemptorist Fathers (*e. g.*, Marc and Aertnys) and in a pamphlet *Théories et Système des Probabilités en Théologie Morale*, par le R. P. M. A. Boisdron, de l'ordre des Frères Prêcheurs." (Fribourg, Suisse, 1894). These facts put in a new light the arguments drawn from the approbation of the works of St. Alphonsus and from the "tolerantia ecclesiae."

Perfect candor demanded these remarks, which must not be interpreted as diminishing in the least the admiration which the writer feels for Father Slater's admirable and useful work. "Lis est adhuc sub iudice," and "Unusquisque in suo sensu abundet."

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

Na Dovine Sidhe is Uirsgeulan eile. Gaelic Fairy Tales. Glasgow, Archibald Sinclair, 1908.

This is the second edition of a collection of three Scottish-Gaelic folk-tales, two of which had already appeared in other collections. *Spiorad na H-aoise*, "The Spirit of Eld" is from the pen of Norman Macleod, better known perhaps as "Caraid nan Gàidheal." *Iolair Loch-Treig*, "The Eagle of Loch Tréig," was written by the late D. C. Macpherson and appeared originally in Vol. I of "The Gael," and *A Bhean Tighe Mhath's Obair-Oidhche*, "The Good Housewife and her Night Labours," is reprinted from the *Craignish Tales* in Vol. I of Campbell of Islay's "Waifs and Strays of Celtic Tradition." These tales are prettily printed in a very artistically gotten up little book, with binding and illustrations in colors in a style of their own. Merely as stories, they are not especially interesting. Their claim lies in the beauty of the Gaelic in which they were told and written, and their value in this, that they form a part of the great body of folk-story of the Gaels of Ireland and of the Highlands. Moreover, they are an offspring of the rich and brilliant imagination which is so characteristic of the fairy tales of Celtic origin. It will be a subject for some investigators some day to make this vast field of Gaelic fairy legend and story the subject of a study which will show the common fund of lore and a common manner of telling of the sea-divided Gael.

Parallels of these, as of many other Highland tales, are found in Irish-Gaelic, for example, the "Spirit of Eld" contains a motive which was found in a tale told to the late John Synge and which he has preserved an outline in his book *The Aran Islands*, Dublin, 1907.

JOSEPH DUNN.

An Irish Precursor of Dante. A Study on the Vision of Heaven and Hell ascribed to the eighth-century Irish Saint Adamnán, with translation of the Irish text, by C. S. Boswell. London, David Nutt, 1908.

A clearly defined visionary trait is one of the most pronounced characteristics of the mediæval literature of the Celts. In the religious literature of Ireland, visions in Irish and in Latin play a large rôle and found their way thence to the Continent. One of the most celebrated of the works belonging to this class of so-called "visionary" writings is the *Fis* or "Vision" which goes under the name of the famous Irish saint Adamnán, who was known as the "High Scholar of the Western World." Not that the work is one of the author to whom it has been ascribed, for, as Mr. C. S. Boswell points out, the *Fis* was surely not composed till fully one hundred years after the death of the abbot of Iona. Mr. Boswell's book, the most recent contribution to the literature on this world-myth, reminds us, by its title, of Alessandro d'Ancona's *I Precursori di Dante*, (Florence, 1874), a work that is still indispensable to the student of the subject. But, Mr. Boswell treats of much more than might be supposed from the title of his book; among other topics, the following are of particular interest to students of Irish civilization in the early Middle Ages: Learning in ancient Ireland, the Constitution of the Irish Church and the *Imram*, or sea-voyage class of Irish wonder-tale. Of wider interest, perhaps, are the chapters on the conception of the Otherworld in classical and oriental tradition and in the tradition of the Eastern and Western Churches. It was not Mr. Boswell's intention to enumerate all the forms which this theme of the Otherworld took on in the earlier and later Middle Ages—to do so would have been to enlarge his work beyond measure, the literature of the period simply teems with tales belonging to this branch of writings. This particular

Vision, the *Fis Adamnáin* is remarkable among other things for its literary quality which is far superior to anything of the time, and for the fact that it represents "the highest level attained by the school to which it belonged, and that it is "the most important contribution made to the growth of the legend within the Christian Church prior to the advent of Dante." It is well known that the *Divina Commedia* was but the culmination of a long line of predecessors who treated of the same or a similar theme. While it is not to be imagined that the subject of the Otherworld was the exclusive property of Irish visionaries, on the other hand it is clearly seen from a comparison of the visions which were composed on Irish soil with those which arose in the Orient and on the continent of Europe that, with its appearance in Ireland, the legend assumed new life and entered upon a fresh career of influence. It can never be shown that Dante Alighieri was acquainted with the Vision of Adamnán until a Latin or Romance version of the *Fis* anterior to Dante's day is known to have existed. But, in this sense at least it is true that the *Fis Adamnáin* was a precursor of the *Divina Commedia*, that Dante was undoubtedly acquainted with such other works of this class as the Vision of Tundale, Saint Patrick's Purgatory and the Voyage of Saint Brendan all of which, as well as many others, had come under the influence of and were more or less moulded by the Vision ascribed to Adamnán.

The Irish text of the *Fis Adamnáin* was published for the first time by Ernest Windisch in his *Irische Texte* from the Book of the Dun Cow and the Speckled Book. It is these texts that Mr. Boswell has taken as the basis for his translation. He has overlooked a third manuscript of the vision, however, which is found at the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. It is probably also by an oversight that he fails to mention the reprint of the translation of the *Fis* by the late Whitley Stokes, published in 1870 in a now extremely rare edition of fifty copies, of which mention is made on pages 27 and 27. These reprints appeared in *Frazer's Magazine* for 1871 and in the appendix to Miss Margaret Stokes' *Three Months in the Forests of France*.

JOSEPH DUNN.

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V. Edited by Charles G. Herbermann, Ph. D., Edward A. Pace, Ph. D., D. D., Conde B. Pallen, Ph. D., LL. D., Thomas J. Shahan, D. D., John J. Wynne, S. J. New York, Robert Appleton Company, 1909.

This volume is in every way worthy of its predecessors. The most sanguine expectations of the friends of the *Encyclopedia* have thus far been more than realized and the enterprise has come to be accepted as an assured success, even by the most timid of its supporters. It is already to be found in the reference room of scholars, editors and libraries throughout the land. It has found its way into many of our parochial school libraries and it is to be hoped that the present volume will go a long way towards making the friend of our parochial schools see the wisdom of placing a set of the *Encyclopedia* in every Catholic school in the land. This would confer an incalculable advantage on the pupils both directly and through their teachers. The pupils would find full and authentic information on many topics concerning which they are misinformed by their associations out of school and by their contact with current literature.

There are many articles in each volume of the *Encyclopedia* that would prove of inestimable value to every intelligent teacher, but in this respect the present volume is particularly strong. The article on Education from the pen of the Very Rev. Dr. Pace is in the author's best style. Its lucid pages and concise statements will make every friend of the *Encyclopedia* wish that his contributions might be more numerous in the subsequent volumes of the work. In the nine pages of this article there is crowded a wealth of information that is usually not to be found in a single volume of whatever size. The article is divided into the following subheads: Education in General; Oriental Education; The Greeks; The Romans; The Jews; Christian Education; Jesus Christ as Teacher; The Aim of Christian Education; The Educational Work of the Church.

The meaning of education is set forth in the opening paragraph which we quote here: "In the broadest sense, education includes all those experiences by which intelligence is developed, knowledge acquired and character formed. In a narrower sense, it is the work done by certain agencies and institutions, the home and the school, for the express purpose of training immature minds. The

child is born with latent capacities which must be developed so as to fit him for the activities and duties of life. The meaning of life, therefore, of its purposes and values as understood by the educator, primarily determines the nature of his work. Education aims at an *ideal*, and this in turn depends on the view that is taken of man and his destiny, of his relations to God, to his fellow men, and to the physical world. The *content* of education is furnished by the previous acquisition of mankind in literature, art, and science, in moral, social, and religious principles. The inheritance, however, contains elements that differ greatly in value, both as mental possessions and as means of culture; hence a selection is necessary, and this must be guided largely by the educational ideal. It will also be influenced by the consideration of the educative *process*. Teaching must be adapted to the needs of the developing mind, and the endeavor to make the adaptation more thorough results in theories and methods which are, or should be, based on the findings of biology, physiology, and psychology."

From the meaning of education as thus set forth the Catholic educator comes to realize the fact that if our schools are to be true to their ideal it cannot copy the methods of the State schools nor adopt their ideals. The mere addition of the religious element to the content of education does not suffice to make education Catholic.

The article then sets forth in a very clear light the relations of home, State and Church to the work of education and makes clear to the educator the need of the history of education as well as the comprehension of the fundamental principles on which the work of the school rests. The inadequacy of purely secular education stands out clearly in the brief review of education among pagan nations. Educators too frequently fail to realize the fact that the religious element in education is necessary not only for the maintenance of the Church but for the very existence of the State as well. Intellectual education alone has, in the experience of the past, always failed to preserve civilization. This is brought out in the closing lines of the paragraph on Roman Education. "The vigorous Roman character yielded but slowly to the intellectualism of the Greeks, and when the latter finally triumphed, far-reaching changes had come about in Roman society, government, and life. Whatever the causes of decline—political, economic, or moral—they could not be stayed by the imported refinement of Greek thought and practice. Nevertheless, pagan

education as a whole, with its ideals, successes, and failures, has a profound significance. It was the product of the highest human wisdom, speculative and practical, that the world has known. It pursued in turn the ideals that appeal most strongly to the human mind. It engaged the thought of the greatest philosophers and the action of the wisest legislators. Art, science, and literature were placed at its service, and the mighty influence of the State was exerted in its behalf. In itself, therefore, and in its results, it shows how much little human reason can accomplish where it seeks no guidance higher than itself and strives for no purposes other than those which find, or may find, their realization in the present phase of existence."

The main portion of the article is naturally devoted to Christian Education. Under the subhead, Jesus Christ as Teacher, there is a vivid delineation of the principles of pedagogy embodied in Our Lord's method of teaching. The forces of His Divine Personality in its appeal to the imitative instinct, the emphasis placed by the Master-Teacher on expression through action, the essential need of purity of motive, the adaptation of His teaching to His hearers and the preparation of the minds of His audience for the truth to be imparted are all clearly stated.

The scholarly article from the pen of Dr. Henry Hyvernât on Egypt occupies thirty-two pages, but there is not one superfluous line in the article. The subject is treated under the following seven heads: General Description; Ancient Egyptian History; Ancient Egyptian Religion; Literary Monuments of Ancient Egypt; The Coptic Church; Coptic Literature; Copto-Arabic Literature. The style is so clear, simple and direct that much of the material is brought within the scope of the older pupils in our parochial schools, while the material and treatment will meet all the requirements of advanced scholarship.

Non-technical students of every shade of belief will be grateful for the very able article on Evolution contributed by Rev. Eric Wasmann, S. J., and Rev. H. Muckermann, S. J. Father Wasmann gives us a very brief and concise statement of the attitude of Catholics towards the theory of Evolution. The most valuable part of this brief essay is to be found in the distinctions which he draws between the various meanings attaching to the word in its popular usage. "We must distinguish (1) between the theory of evolution as a scientific hypothesis and as a philosophic speculation; (2) between the theory of evolution as based on theistic

principles and as based on a materialistic and atheistic foundation; (3) between the theory of evolution and Darwinism; (4) between the theory of evolution as applied to the vegetable and animal kingdoms and as applied to man." He points out that "the scientific theory of evolution, therefore, does not concern itself with the origin of life. It merely inquires into the genetic relations of systematic species, genera, and families and endeavors to arrange them according to natural series of descent. . . . This is the gist of the theory of evolution as a scientific hypothesis. It is in perfect agreement with the Christian conception of the universe; for Scripture does not tell us in what form the present species of plants and of animals were originally created by God. As early as 1877 Knabenbauer stated 'that there is no objection, so far as faith is concerned, to assuming the descent of all plant and animal species from a few types.'" Evolution as a philosophical theory is explained and the attitude of the Church towards it is then stated in these words: "This conception is in agreement with the Christian view of the universe. God is the creator of heaven and earth. If God produced the universe by a single creative act of His will, then its natural development by laws implanted in it by the Creator is to the greater glory of His Divine Power and Wisdom." St. Thomas and Suarez are quoted in support.

The theory of evolution founded on atheistic principles is then stated and the fallacies on which it rests pointed out. Finally, the theory of evolution as applied to man is stated by Father Wassmann in these words: "That God should have made use of natural, evolutionary, original causes in the production of man's body, is *per se* not improbable, and was propounded by St. Augustine. The actual proofs of the descent of man's body from animals is, however, inadequate, especially in respect to palaeontology. And the human soul could not have been derived through natural evolution from that of the brute, since it is of a spiritual nature; for which reason we must refer its origin to a creative act on the history and scientific foundations of the theory of evolution which is replete with interest for scholars in every field of modern thought."

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES, 1908-1909.

The commencement exercises of the Catholic University of America, held Wednesday, June 12, in McMahon Hall, marked the closing of the twentieth year of that institution. Grouped upon the platform beneath the painting of Leo XIII were the deans of the several faculties. In the center of the stage sat the Rev. Dr. Thomas Joseph Shahan, Rector of the University. Clergymen from every section of the country, men distinguished in the world of letters and of art, and a large number of relatives and friends of the priests, seminarians, and lay students assembled to witness the conferring of degrees.

Dr. Shahan opened the exercises, and following the presentation of degrees by the deans of the faculties, he gave a review of the history of the university.

"In the last twenty years," said Dr. Shahan, "very much has been accomplished. The university found Northeast Washington an undeveloped section of the city. Gradually this section has developed in contact with the life and work of the university, until now Brookland and Bloomingdale are rightly accounted among the most desirable parts of our beautiful city.

"More important, however, is the actual development of our university. Its professors have grown from 4 to 32, and its students have increased in proportion. The university now counts about 225 registered students, of whom 85 are lay students, partly graduate, partly undergraduate.

"An admirable library has been created, containing some 65,000 volumes, and, including the professors' libraries, is much nearer 130,000 volumes, no small achievement in two decades of existence.

"Generally speaking, the Catholic University of America has every reason to congratulate itself on its present status. It has outlived many difficulties and trials, has proved its right to exist amid similar work, has earned a high place in the

Catholic life of the world, and will accomplish eventually all that its founders had in mind when, with unparalleled zeal and earnestness, they undertook this great work. The university has enjoyed the generous direction of two Popes—Leo XIII and Pius X. It is in them and their successors that the university places its chief hope of attaining one day the fullness of its calling.”

The degrees granted were as follows:

A.B.—Oswald Martin Crotty, Cleveland, Ohio; Mariano Lora y Romero, Havana, Cuba; Frank Alphonso Mulvanity, Nashua, N. H.; Peter Marie Nicrosi, Montgomery, Ala.; Edward Joseph Ralph, Washington, D. C.; Vincent LeRoy Toomey, Washington, D. C.

A.M.—Bernard Joseph Vincent, Ph.B., New York City.

B.S.—Diego Ramos, B.S. in C.E., Mexico City, Mexico; Yasuke Wakamiya, B.S. in C. E., Toyoma, Japan; Louis Henry Crook, Washington D, C.

C.E.—William Bernard Fennell, B.S., Washington, D. C.

PH.B.—Rev. Matthias Joseph Gillen, Saint Paul, Minn.; Francis Marmion Kelly, Houston, Minn.; Joseph Simon Loughran, Washington, D. C.; Bernard Joseph Vincent, New York, N. Y.

PH.M.—Rev. Arthur Joseph Scanlon, Ph.B., New York; Rev. Patrick Francis Mackin, A.B., New York City.

PH.D.—Richard Stephen Burke, A.M., Ph.M., Boston, Mass.; Joseph Henry Burke, A.B., C.S.C., Washington, D. C.; Thomas Patrick Irving, A.B., C.S.C., Washington, D. C.

LL.B.—Oswald Martin Crotty, A.B., Cleveland, Ohio; John Collins Moran, A.B., Providence, R. I.; Benedict Joseph Semmes, A.B., Memphis, Tenn.; Leo Aloysius Smyth, A.B., Memphis, Tenn.; Vincent LeRoy Toomey, A.B., Washington, D. C.

LL.M.—George Anthony Canale, A.B., LL.B., Memphis, Tenn.; John Pritchard Kenney, LL.B., Lowell, Mass.; Hon. J. Davis Brodhead, M.C., Bethlehem, Pa.

J.D.—Arthur Benedict Crotty, J.D., LL.B., LL.M., Cleveland, Ohio; Hon. William Milnes Maloy, LL.B., LL.M., Baltimore, Md.

S.T.B.—Rev. Edward Herman Amsinger, Archdiocese of St. Louis, Mo.; Rev. James Joseph Dacey, Diocese of Albany; Rev. James Deenihan, Diocese of Los Angeles; Rev. John Baptist Delaunay, A.B., Ph.D., Congregation of Holy Cross; Rev. Michael J. Doyle, Archdiocese of San Francisco; Rev. John Francis Ambrose Georgelin, Marist Congregation; Rev. Joseph Patrick Green, Archdiocese of New York; Rev. John Capistran Gruden, Archdiocese of St. Paul; Rev. James Edward Kearney, Archdiocese of New York; Rev. Michael Joseph Keyes, Marist Congregation; Rev. Thomas Joseph McCormick, A.B., Archdiocese of New York; Rev. John Conrad Melies, Archdiocese of St. Louis; Rev. Joseph Patrick Munday, A.B., A.M., Diocese of Alton; Rev. Walter Alexander O'Hara, A.B., A.M., Diocese of Pittsburg; Rev. John Michael Ryan, B.L., Congregation of Holy Cross; Rev. Paul John Sandalgi, Archdiocese of Baltimore; Rev. Patrick Joseph Waters, Archdiocese of Boston, Mass.

J.C.B.—Rev. Patrick Stephen Canning, Diocese of Providence; Rev. John Baptist Delaunay, A.B., Ph.D., Congregation of Holy Cross; Rev. John Andrew Françon, Archdiocese of New Orleans; Rev. Joseph Patrick Green, Archdiocese of New York; Rev. Charles Whittenmore Heath, Archdiocese of Baltimore; Rev. James Edward Kearney, Archdiocese of New York; Rev. Thomas Joseph McCormick, A.B., Archdiocese of New York; Rev. John Conrad Melies, Archdiocese of St. Louis; Rev. Walter Alexander O'Hara, A.B., A.M., Diocese of Pittsburg; Rev. Michael Lawrence Ryan, S.T.B., Diocese of Providence; Rev. Joseph Leo Noel Wolfe, S.T.B., Archdiocese of Philadelphia.

S.T.L.—John Andrew Françon, S.T.B., Archdiocese of New Orleans; Rev. Thomas Joseph Loughlin, S.T.B., Diocese

of Albany; Rev. Leo Edward Ryan, S.T.B., Archdiocese of New York; Rev. Thomas Francis Ryder, S.T.B., Congregation of St. Paul; Rev. George Aloysius Sinnott, S.T.B., Archdiocese of New York; Rev. Joseph Leo Noel Wolfe, S.T.B., Archdiocese of Philadelphia; Rev. James Patrick Towey, S. T. B., Congregation of St. Paul.

S.T.D.—Rev. Nicholas Aloysius Weber, S.T.L., Marist Congregation.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Baccalaureate Sunday. On Sunday, June 6th, Solemn High Mass was celebrated in Caldwell Hall in the presence of the body of professors, students and graduates of the University. The celebrant of the Mass was Right Reverend Monsignor Thomas Sim Lee, and the preacher of the baccalaureate sermon was Reverend Doctor William Russell, pastor of St. Patrick's Church, Washington, D. C.

Donations. Mrs. Bellamy Storer has given to the University the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars, as a contribution to the Endowment Fund.—His Grace the Archbishop of Philadelphia contributed One Hundred Dollars towards completing the collection of publications of foreign learned societies which was mentioned in the June *Bulletin*.—Dr. Hyvernats has acquired for his private library and has placed at the disposal of the University the valuable collection belonging to the celebrated French Orientalist, Professor Rubens Duval. The collection consists of five or six hundred volumes, chiefly on Syriac and Hebrew literature.

The Museum. The gratitude of all interested in the University is due to Mr. James C. Mooney, of the American Bureau of Ethnology, for the kind interest he took in the University Museum and the time and care which he expended this summer in superintending its transfer to the third floor of McMahon Hall.

Mr. Myles P. O'Connor. By the death of Judge Myles Poore O'Connor, of San José, California, the University lost a generous benefactor and beloved friend. Judge O'Connor is the Founder of the Chair of Canon Law.

Appointments. Dr. Frank O'Hara has been appointed Instructor in Economics. Dr. O'Hara is a native of Minnesota.

He received his early education at Lanesboro in that state and was graduated with honor from the classical course of the state university, in 1900. The next year he spent at the University of Notre Dame where he received the Master's degree for work in economics and philosophy. After two years' work in economics, philosophy and history at the University of Berlin he was granted the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, *cum laude*, in 1904. In 1905 he was editor of the *Catholic Progress*, Seattle. His teaching experience covers high school work at Butte, Montana, La Porte, Indiana and Chicago, and two years at the University of Notre Dame where he was Professor of Economics and History.

Rev. John M. Cooper, Ph. D., D. D., Assistant Pastor of St. Matthew's Church, Washington, D. C., has been appointed lecturer on Christian Doctrine.

Rev. Nicholas Weber, S. T. D., of the Marist College, has been appointed to lecture on History in the Undergraduate Department.